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INTRODUCTION
Pediatric AIDS1 occupies a charged landscape where a public health crisis
attracting considerable social, political and scientific attention 2 collides with
public distrust of the reproductive decisions of poor women of color and
increasing scrutiny of the behavior of all pregnant women. The discovery of
medical therapies that reduce significantly the likelihood that an IV-infected
woman will give birth to an HIV-infected child, as well as advances in the
successful treatment of infected children, have produced a number of state laws
and policy proposals calling for universal HIV testing of pregnant women and
newborns so that all infected individuals can be identified for treatment. 3 The
continuing debate among policymakers in this area is whether pregnant women
and new mothers should have the right to choose for themselves whether they
and their children should be tested for HIV, or whether prenatal and newborn
HIV testing should be mandatory or subject only to some truncated version of
informed consent.
HIV-infected women may be particularly vulnerable to state intervention
aimed at controlling their behavior during pregnancy and motherhood. They are
1. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is the final stage in the clinical progression of HIV
disease, or infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus. Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland,
Transmission and Treatment, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 18, 35 (Scott Burris et al.
eds., 1993). HIV infection impairs immune function and makes the infected individual vulnerable to serious
opportunistic infections. Id. at 33-34. HIV infection is recognized as AIDS when certain specific, severe
complications develop. Id. at 30. Pediatric AIDS is AIDS occurring in children under thirteen years of age.
Centers for Disease Control, AIDS Among Children-United States, 1996, 45 MoRBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1005, 1005 (1996).
2. One indication of the multidisciplinary controversy surrounding AIDS is the amount of litigation it has
generated. "Sharp differences in perception of public health, ethics, and civil liberties have created the largest
body of legal cases attributable to a single disease in the history of American jurisprudence." Lawrence 0.
Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of Court and Human Rights Commission Decisions,
Part I: The Social Impact of AIDS, 263 JAMA 1961, 1961 (1990).
3. Current proposals and their historical origins are discussed in detail in Part II infra.
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overwhelmingly poor women of color,4 and their infection is seen by many as an
unfortunate but not unblameworthy consequence of illegal drug use and
irresponsible sex.5 Like pregnant drug users who have been frequent targets of
public scorn and state coercion, 6 HIV-infected women can be facilely cast as bad
mothers who must be stopped from harming their innocent children. At the same
time, the "problem" of HIV-infected women giving birth to WHV-infected
children can be "solved" largely with medical interventions that on a superficial
level do not touch upon the issues of addiction and law enforcement that have
made state efforts to prevent drug use during pregnancy so difficult and
controversial. 7 Proposals for coercive HIV-testing regimes do not raise the
specter of women giving birth in chains8 that makes prenatal drug interventions
so offensive to some, no matter how appropriate that image may be when the
consequences of involuntary universal testing are explored.
In light of the risk that prenatal and newborn HIV-testing programs may be
motivated in significant part by discrimination and moral judgment hidden
beneath a veil of objective medical fact, proposals for widespread I-V testing of
all pregnant women and newborns must be examined with some skepticism even
if the potential health benefits of these programs are unquestionable. Part I of
this paper discusses the epidemiology of IV infection in women and children
and the medical issues underlying public health proposals to test pregnant
women and newborns for HIV. Part II places these proposals in a historical
context that includes decades of state efforts to control childbearing by poor
women of color and disabled women, and traces the increasing interest in
monitoring the behavior of pregnant women in the name of fetal rights. Part III
provides a timeline of various efforts to prevent perinatal9 transmission of HIV
from mother to child and describes current proposals for universal HIV testing of
pregnant women and newborns. Part IV analyzes current WV-screening
proposals within nonlegal frameworks provided by public health and ethics. Part
V examines the constitutionality of prenatal and newborn HV-testing regimes
4. In 1997, sixty percent of AIDS cases reported in women occured in Black, non-Hispanic women,
while Hispanic women account for another twenty percent of female AIDS patients. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
REDUCING THE ODDS: PREVENTING PERINATAL TRANSMISSION OF HIV IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (1999). Most
women infected with HIV are poor. Lawrence Wilson et al., Psychological Issues for Children Born to HIV-
Infected Mothers, in HIV, AIDS AND CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES 78, 82 (Ruth R. Faden &
Nancy E. Kass eds., 1996).
5. See, e.g., Melinda Madison, Tragic Life or Tragic Death: Mandatory Testing of Newborns for HIV-
Mothers'Rights Versus Children's Health, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 361, 385 (1997) ("HIV infection often results
from carelessness and promiscuity"). Injection drug use and exposure to semen during intercourse are two of
the primary causes of HIV infection in women. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
6. Beginning in the 1980s, many states and municipalities began pursuing criminal sanctions and abuse
and neglect charges against pregnant drug users. Katherine Acuff, Perinatal Drug Use: State Interventions and
the Implications for HIV-Infected Women, in HIV, AIDS AND CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES,
supra note 4, 214, 219-22.
7. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1294 (U.S. March 21, 2001) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that constitutional objection to hospital's prenatal drug testing policy was founded on
extensive coordination with law enforcement, not state intervention in medical care).
8. See id. at 1295.
9. Perinatal means "[o]curring during, or pertaining to, the periods before, during, or after the time of
birth." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1329 (26th ed. 1995).
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under the Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment. In conclusion, Part
VI puts together the public health, ethical and legal frameworks of analysis, and
offers a critique of current proposals to reduce the incidence of pediatric AIDS
through universal HIV testing of pregnant women and newborns.
I. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
A. EPIDEMIOLOGY OF HIV/AIDS IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN
An estimated 125,000 American women have been diagnosed with AIDS,10
and approximately three-quarters of these women are of childbearing age."
Although, historically, most female AIDS cases have been attributed to injection
drug use (IDU), 12 heterosexual contact is now the primary cause of AIDS in
women.13
AIDS has a disproportionate impact on women of color. African-American,
non-Hispanic women account for approximately sixty percent of AIDS cases
reported in women, while Hispanic women constitute another twenty percent.
14
Most women with AIDS are poor.15 While AIDS is the fourth leading cause of
death among all women aged twenty-five to forty-four in the United States, it is
the number one cause of death for African-American women in this age group.16
Approximately seven thousand babies are born to HIV-infected women each
year.17 Anywhere from fourteen to thirty-three percent of these babies will be
HIV-infected themselves.1 8 Children born to HIV-infected mothers account for
10. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 12, 13
(2000).
11. Id. Less is known about the total number of HIV-infected women in the United States, as only 34
States report cases of non-AIDS HIV infection and even some of these states have only begun reporting cases
as recently as 1999. Id. at 7. However, the information that is available indicates that an even greater proportion
of HIV-infected women (eighty-six percent) are of childbearing age than the AIDS diagnosis figures indicate.
Id. at 13.
12. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HIV SCREENING OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS 14 (Leslie M.
Hardy ed., 1991).
13. For example, although forty-one percent of the female AIDS cases reported to the CDC cumulatively
by June 2000 were attributed to IDU, only twenty-seven percent of the cases reported between July 1999 and
June 2000 were so attributed. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 10, at 12. The
number of AIDS cases attributed to heterosexual contact over these two time periods remained stable at forty
percent and thirty-nine percent, respectively. Id. The proportion of cases in which a risk behavior was not
identified was thirty-three percent among cases reported from July 1999 to June 2000, though this group
represented only fifteen percent of cases reported cumulatively. Id. Most of the cases initially reported as risk
not identified are later attributed to heterosexual contact. For example, of the cumulative total of female AIDS
cases reported to the CDC as risk not identified by June 2000, sixty-eight percent were later attributed to
heterosexual contact and twenty-seven percent to IDU. Id. at 25. Data available on HIV infection indicates that
twenty percent of the cases reported by June 2000 were attributed to IDU and forty-one percent to heterosexual
contact. Of the remaining cases of HIV infection, thirty-eight percent were reported as risk not identified. Id. at
13.
14. See supra note 4.
15. Id.
16. M.F. Rogers, Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in Women and Children in the USA, 86 AcTA PAEDIATRICA
15, 15 (Supp. 421 1997).
17. Madison, supra note 5, at 362.
18. See Part 1.B infra.
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ninety-one percent of all pediatric AIDS cases.1 9 Due to the primary role
perinatal transmission plays in causing pediatric AIDS, children with AIDS are
overwhelmingly non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic, 20 just as their mothers are.
Most HIV-infected mothers of children with perinatally-acquired AIDS report
IDU (twenty-nine percent) and heterosexual contact (thirty-six percent) as their
risk factors for HIV infection, 2 1 mirroring the risk factors associated with HIV
infection in women in general.22
B. PERINATAL TRANSMISSION OF HIV
HIV transmission from mother to infant can occur during gestation, during
labor and delivery, or postpartum as a result of breast feeding.23 Although the
exact timing of perinatal transmission is not perfectly understood, scientists
believe that approximately twenty-five percent to thirty percent of instances of
perinatal HIV transmission occur during gestation, 24 while up to seventy percent
to seventy-five percent occur at the time of delivery.25 The breast milk
transmission rate is fourteen percent in the case of mothers who are seropositive,
i.e. test positive for HIV antibodies, at the time of delivery, but a significantly
higher transmission rate of twenty-nine percent is found in mothers experiencing
26primary HIV infection during the postpartum period. Overall, in the absence of
medical intervention, fourteen percent to thirty-three percent of children born to
HIV-infected women become HIV-infected themselves.
27
The first major advance in the prevention of perinatal transmission of H1V
occurred in 1994, when the results of AIDS Clinical Trials Group protocol 076
(ACTG 076) were announced to the public.28 ACTG 076 was a double-blind,
randomized clinical trial in which one group of HIV-infected women was given
zidovudine (ZDV) 29 during their pregnancies, while another group of HIV-
19. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 10, at 12. Blood transfusions account for
almost all remaining pediatric AIDS cases. As classified by the CDC, pediatric AIDS cases are those cases
occurring in children less than thirteen years of age. See supra note 1.
20. As of September 30, 1996, fifty-eight percent of children under thirteen diagnosed with AIDS were
non-Hispanic Black and twenty-three percent were Hispanic. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 1, at
1006. Together these two demographic groups make up only thirty percent of children under thirteen years of
age in the United States. Rogers, supra note 16, at 15.
21. Rogers, supra note 16, at 15.
22. See supra note 13.
23. Katherine Luzuriaga & John L. Sullivan, Prevention and Treatment of Pediatric HVlInfection, 280
JAMA 17, 17 (1998).
24. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 45.
25. Luzuriaga & Sullivan, supra note 23, at 17. Possible mechanisms for neonatal acquisition of the HIV
virus during labor and delivery include direct exposure to maternal blood and genital tract secretions, as well as
transplacental microtransfusions. Id.
26. J. Kreiss, Breasqfeeding and Vertical Transmission of HIV-1, 86 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 113, 113 (Supp.
421 1997).
27. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 39.
28. See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Zidovudine for the Prevention of HIV
Transmission from Mother to Infant, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 285 (1994).
29. ZDV is a nucleoside analog reverse transcriptase inhibitor that has been shown to have moderate
antiviral effects for the treatment of persons with HIV disease at all stages of the disease. Mary Culnane et al.,
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infected women was given a placebo. 30 The HIV transmission rate in the placebo
group was 25.5%, whereas only 8.3% of the children born to women in the ZDV
group were infected with HIV. Compliance with the 076 regimen produced a
67.5% relative reduction in the transmission of the HIV virus from mother to
infant.3 '
The United States Public Health Service quickly recommended that doctors
offer the 076 regimen to their HIV-infected pregnant patients, and discuss the
potential risks and benefits of the treatment with them.32 The substantial benefits
of the regimen in terms of reducing the risk of perinatal transmission were clear;
the risks of ZDV treatment during pregnancy were, and remain, less certain. For
example, women taking ZDV have reported side effects including bone marrow
suppression, muscle inflammation, headaches, nausea, vomiting and anemia.
3 3
Perhaps of more concern, it is unclear whether the use of ZDV during pregnancy
solely to reduce the odds of perinatal transmission can cause the development of
a ZDV-resistant virus strain in the mother that might lessen the drug's
therapeutic effect when it is later needed to preserve her own health.34
The Public Health Service also cautioned that the long-term effects of the
076 regimen on infants were not known. The only direct short-term effect
35experienced by infants in the 076 trial was mild and reversible anemia.
However, concerns about the long-term toxicity of perinatal exposure to ZDV
36include potential mutagenic and carcinogenic effects, possible effects on heart
or liver tissue, 37 and possible teratogenicity. 38 Despite these uncertainties, the
Lack of Long-Term Effects of In Utero Exposure to Zidovudine Among Uninfected Children Born to H1V-
Infected Women, 281 JAMA 151, 151-52 (1999). ZDV was previously known as AZT. INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 1.
30. The ACTG 076 treatment regimen is rather complex. Pregnant women enrolled in the trial took ZDV
or a placebo orally five times daily for a median period of eleven weeks prior to the delivery. ZDV or the
placebo was then given to the women intravenously during labor and delivery. Finally, the children bom into
the trial were given ZDV or a placebo orally every six hours for the first six weeks after birth. Edward M.
Connor et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Firus Type 1 with
Zidovudine Treatment, 331 NEwENG. J. MED 1173, 1173 (1994).
31. Id.at1176.
32. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommendations of the US Public Health Service Task
Force on the Use of Zidovudine to Reduce Perinatal Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency /irus, 43
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 6-7 (RR-I 1 1994).
33. THEODORE J. STEIN, THE SOCIAL WELFARE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN WITH HIV AND AIDS: LEGAL
PROTECTIONS, POLICY AND PROGRAMS 97 (1998).
34. K. Mclntosh, Antiretroviral Resistance and HIV Vertical Transmission, 86 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 29, 31
(Supp. 421 1997); Centers for Disease Control, supra note 32, at 6.
35. Connor et al., supra note 30, at 1178.
36. At least two studies in mice have found that exposure to high doses of ZDV in utero increased risk
for cancer in the exposed offspring. Inaam A. Nakchbandi et al., A Decision Analysis of Mandatory Compared
with Voluntary HIV Testing in Pregnant Women, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 760, 766 (1998). See also
Centers for Disease Control, supra note 32, at 5 (ZDV shown to be a carcinogen in rodents).
37. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 32, at 5.
38. The Food and Drug Administration places ZDV therapy during pregnancy in risk class C, indicating
that the drug may have teratogenic or embryocidal effects but that available data are insufficient to make a firm
conclusion on this issue. Craig J. Newschaffer et al., Prenatal Zidovudine Use and Congenital Anomalies in a
Medicaid Population, 24 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 249, 249 (2000). One study analyzing
all HIV-positive infants in the New York State Medicaid System, the vast majority of whom were presumably
perinatally exposed to ZDV given the widespread adoption of the 076 regimen, found that the risk of a major
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Public Health Service concluded that health care providers should recommend
the full 076 regimen to all HIV-infected pregnant women who fit the criteria for
admission to the clinical trial.39
The 076 regimen has been very successful on the ground in reducing
perinatal transmission of HIV. Studies conducted in the United States and Europe
indicate widespread acceptance of the 076 regimen among HIV-infected
pregnant women.40 The number of perinatal AIDS cases peaked in 1992 and
declined sixty-seven percent from 1992 to 1997.41 Although some of this
decrease is associated with a reduction in the number of births to HIV-infected
women,42 most of it reflects the effects of perinatal ZDV therapy.43 Observed
perinatal transmission rates in the developed world have fallen to between three
percent and ten percent.
44
The continuing relevance of the 076 regimen and perinatal ZDV therapy is
unclear. Ironically, dramatic breakthroughs in AIDS treatment involving the use
of combination therapies may have seriously complicated efforts to reduce the
perinatal transmission of HiV. The early initiation of aggressive combination
congenital anomaly was 2.79 times greater in the study cohort than in the general New York State population.
Id. at 249-52; see also Centers for Disease Control, supra note 32, at 5 (acknowledging possible teratogenic
effects of perinatal ZDV exposure). But see A. White et al., Birth Outcomes Following Zidovudine Exposure in
Pregnant Women: The Antiretroviral Pregnancy Registry, 86 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 86, 86 (Supp. 421 1997)
(finding no increase in the number of birth defects following perinatal ZDV exposure when compared to
general population).
39. The ACTG 076 trial was open only to HIV-infected pregnant women who had CD4+ T-lymphocyte
counts above two hundred cells per cubic millimeter and who had not received antiretroviral therapy during the
current pregnancy prior to enrollment in the trial. Connor, supra note 30, at 1173. At the time the Public Health
Service released its recommendations for ZDV treatment counseling of pregnant women in 1994, it was unclear
whether the 076 results could be replicated in women with more advanced HIV disease or with prior
antiretroviral treatment. Id. at 1178. As a result, the Public Health Service did not suggest that health care
providers specifically recommend the 076 regimen to women who did not meet the trial's enrollment criteria.
Rather, the Public Health Service merely indicated that HIV-infected pregnant women not meeting the 076
criteria be informed of the results and limitations of the 076 results, as well as the risks of treatment, and be
allowed to make their own decisions about whether to undertake the treatment. Centers for Disease Control,
supra note 32, at 6-7. Subsequent observational studies have shown that ZDV in fact is effective in reducing
perinatal transmission in groups of women with more advanced disease and women with prior use of ZDV
Mary Lou Lindegren et al., Trends in Prenatal Transmission of HIV/AIDS in the United States, 282 JAMA 531,
531 (1999).
40. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 48; Susan Fiscus et al., Perinatal HIV Infection and the
Effect of Zidovudine Therapy on Transmission in Rural and Urban Counties, 275 JAMA 1483, 1486 (1996).
But see Andrew A. Wiznia et al., Zidovudine Use to Reduce Perinatal HIV Type 1 Transmission in an Urban
Medical Center, 275 JAMA 1504, 1505 (1996) (finding that twenty-five percent of HIV-pregnant women
refused ZDV treatment entirely and only sixty-seven percent of those women choosing to undertake the 076
regimen successfully completed all components thereof).
41. Lindegren et al., supra note 39, at 533.
42. Between 1992 and 1995, the CDC's Survey of Childbearing Women detected a seventeen percent
decline in the number of births to HIV-infected women. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 40. The
Survey of Childbearing Women was a blinded serosurveillance survey that operated from 1989 to 1995. Julie
D. Levinson, While Ignorance May Not Be Bliss, It Is a Mother s Right: Constitutional Implications of Testing
Newborn Babies for HIV, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 71, 72 (1996). To conduct the survey, personal identifiers
were removed from heelstick blood samples routinely taken from all newborns. The samples were then sent to
labs where they were tested for HIV antibodies, thereby revealing the HIV status of the mother of the child
from whom the blood was taken. The test did not reveal the HIV status of the child. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
supra note 4, at 33; see also infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
43. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 40; Centers for Disease Control, supra note 1, at 1008-09.
44. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 48.
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therapy' 5 is now the standard of care for the treatment of all HIV-infected
individuals, including pregnant women, and ZDV monotherapy of the kind
involved in the 076 regimen is no longer recommended.46 In 1998, the Public
Health Service issued guidelines stating that pregnancy is not a reason to defer
standard HIV therapy, and urging health care providers to continue their HIV-
infected patients on combination therapy during pregnancy.47 However, there is
little data on the efficacy of combination therapy to reduce perinatal
transmission, or the tolerance and appropriate dosage when combination therapy
is used in pregnant women.48 Almost no information is available on the potential
long-term toxic effects of antiretroviral drugs other than ZDV on infants exposed
perinatally.49 No studies document the acceptance of the experimental use of
combination regimens during pregnancy by HIV-infected pregnant women.
Recently, elective cesarean section 50 also has been associated with reduced
rates of perinatal HIV transmission. An analysis of fifteen perinatal transmission
studies focusing on the mode of infant delivery documented a transmission rate
of 10.4% in mothers receiving no antiretroviral therapy and delivering by
elective cesarean section, and a transmission rate of only two percent in mothers
receiving ZDV monotherapy and delivering by elective cesarean section.,, It is
unclear whether the results of these delivery mode studies can be replicated in
women receiving combination therapy rather than ZDV monotherapy.
52
45. Combination therapy generally consists of two nucleoside analog reverse transcriptase inhibitors and
a protease inhibitor. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Service Task Force
Recommendations for the Use of Antiretroviral Drugs in Pregnant Women Infected with HV-1 for Maternal
Health and for Reducing Perinatal HIV-1 Transmission in the United States, 47 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 1, 2 (RR-2 1998).
46. Culnane et al., supra note 29, at 156.
47. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 45, at 1.
48. Luzuriaga & Sullivan, supra note 23, at 17.
49. Of eleven antiretrovirals other than ZDV commonly used in combination therapy, six are listed in
FDA pregnancy category C. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 50; see also supra note 38 (describing
significance of category C). Another, Efavirenz, has been associated with severe congenital anomalies in
monkeys and is not recommended for use during pregnancy. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 49. A
Phase I evaluation of perinatal use of antiretroviral combination regimens including protease inhibitors is
underway through the AIDS Clinical Trials Group, as is a Phase 3 clinical trial of the nonnucleoside reverse
transcriptase inhibitor nevirapine. Luzuriaga & Sullivan, supra note 23, at 17.
50. Elective cesarean sections are those performed before the onset of labor and rupture of membranes.
International Perinatal HIV Group, The Mode of Delivery and the Risk of Vertical Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency irus Type 1. A Meta-Analysis of 15 Prospective Cohort Studies, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED.
977, 977 (1999). Elective cesarean sections prevent perinatal transmission because they avoid both
microtransfusions of maternal blood during labor and direct fetal contact with maternal blood and genital tract
secretions during delivery. Id. at 984.
51. Id. at 983; see also The European Mode of Delivery Collaborative, Elective Caesarean-Section
Versus Vaginal Delivery in Prevention of Vertical HIV-1 Transmission: A Randomised Clinical Trial, 353
LANCET 1035, 1037 (1999) (showing similar transmission rates with elective cesarean sections). The same
analysis showed transmission rates of nineteen percent in women receiving no antiretroviral therapy and
delivering by a method other than elective cesarean section, and 7.3% in women on ZDV monotherapy and
delivering by a method other than elective cesarean section. International Perinatal HIV Group, supra note 50,
at 983.
52. Id. at 985-86.
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C. DIAGNOSIS OF HIVINFECTION IN WOMEN AND INFANTS
Pregnant women, like other adults, are screened for HIV infection using an
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and a confirmatory Western blot
test.53 Both ELISA and the Western blot detect the presence of HIV antibodies,
rather than the presence of the HIV virus itself.54 Like other antibody tests, the
ELISA and Western blot indicate the occurrence of past infection, and there may
be a time lag between primary HIV infection and the production of detectable
IIV antibodies.5 5  All infants born to HIV-infected women are born with
their mothers' antibodies and so test positive when given ELISA and Western
blot tests at birth.56 Infants lose their maternal antibodies at fifteen to eighteen
months of age, and it is only at that time that the antibody tests used to detect
HIV infection in adults will reveal the true HIV status of the tested child; prior to
that time, antibody tests will only reveal the HIV status of the child's mother.
57
Nonetheless, most newborn IfV-screening programs rely initially on antibody
tests to identify infants who have been born to HIV-infected mothers, with only
the infants so identified receiving more specific virologic testing.58  Once it is
determined that an infant has been born to an HIV-infected mother,59 the infant
will receive tests that detect the presence of the HIV virus itself and thereby
indicate whether the infant is truly infected with HIV. The American Academy
of Pediatrics (AAP) recommends that all HIV-exposed infants be tested using
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) at birth, at one to two months of age, and
regularly thereafter until negative HIV status is confirmed. 60 HIV-exposed
infants whose PCR results remain negative up to six months of age are
considered HIV-negative.
6 1
53. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 51. A diagnosis of HIV infection in adults requires two
reactive ELISAs, confirmed by Western blot or immunofluorescence assay. Id.
54. John Modlin & Alfred Saah, Public Health and Clinical Aspects of HIV Infection and Disease in
Women and Children in the United States, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION: TOWARDS A
MORALLY ACCEPTABLE PUBLIC POLICY FOR HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEwBORNS 29, 32-35
(Ruth R. Faden et al. eds., 1991).
55. Id. at 32.
56. Nancy Hutton, Health Prospects for Children Born to HIV-Infected Women, in HIV, AIDS AND
CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES, 63, at 64 (Ruth R. Faden & Nancy E. Kass, eds., 1996)
Throughout this paper, the group of all infants born to HIV-infected women, including both those infants that
are HIV-infected themselves and those who are not, will be referred to HIV-exposed.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., David F. McNeeley, Newborn Screening for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in
the Bronx, N), and Evolving Public Health Policy, 16 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 503, 504 (1999).
59. This occurs either when the health care provider knows that the mother is HPV-infected prior to
delivery, or when an antibody test performed on the newborn reveals the presence of maternal HIV antibodies.
Id.
60. American Academy of Pediatrics, Conmmittee on Pediatric AIDS, Evaluation and Medical Treatment
of the HIV-Exposed Infant, 99 PEDIATRICS 909, 911 (1997).
61. Luzuriaga & Sullivan, supra note 23, at 18.
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D. DISEASE PROGRESSION AND RECOMMENDED MEDICAL
TREA TMENT FOR CHILDREN WITH PERINATALL Y A CQUIRED HIV
INFECTION
HIV infection in children who acquire the virus perinatally follows one of
two patterns. Rapid disease progression (RPD) occurs in ten percent to thirty
percent of HIV-infected infants. 62 When it occurs, RPD results in immunologic
depletion and the occurrence of an AIDS-defining event in the first few months
of life.63 Infants exposed perinatally to ZDV are significantly more likely to
exhibit RPD than infants not exposed to ZDV.64
Seventy percent to ninety percent of HIV-infected infants exhibit non-rapid
disease progression (NRPD). NRPD is characterized by the gradual impairment
of immunologic function over a number of years, and generally follows a pattern
of disease progression similar to that found in infected adults.65 Accordingly,
even before the widespread use of combination therapy for treatment of HIV
infection, pediatric HIV disease usually presented as a chronic childhood
condition rather than an immediate death sentence. For example, by the end of
1993, only fifty percent of children with perinatally-acquired HIV infection
developed severe signs or symptoms by five years of age, 66 and the median
survival time from birth to death of all children in this group was 9.4 years.
67
Most HIV-infected children had no symptoms or were only moderately
symptomatic for more than half of their expected life.68
The increased use first of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP)
prophylaxis,69 and later of combination therapy, significantly improved the
outlook for HIV-infected infants, and has spurred health care providers to
strongly recommend the earliest possible identification of all infants exposed to
62. L.M. Mofenson, Interaction Between liming of Perinatal Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection
and the Design of Preventive and Therapeutic Interventions, 86 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 1, 3 (Supp. 421 1997).
63. Ricardo S. de Souza et al., Effect of Prenatal Zidovudine on Disease Progression in Perinatally HV-
1-Infected Infants, 24 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 154, 154 (2000). An example of an
AIDS-defining event is the onset of an opportunistic infection characteristic of HIV infection such as
Pneumoncystis carinii pneumonia. See generally, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 39.
64. In a recent study, 70.6% of infants exposed perinatally to ZDV exhibited RPD, while only 29.4% of
infants with no ZDV exposure exhibited RPD. de Souza, supra note 63, at 157. If they do not receive early
treatment with combination therapy after birth, HIV-infected infants exposed perinatally to ZDV are 1.8 times
more likely to die of AIDS than infected infants with no ZDV exposure. Louise Kuhn et al., Disease
Progression and Early Viral Dynamics in Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Infected Children Exposed to
Zidovudine During Prenatal and Perinatal Periods, 182 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 104, 105 (2000). One author
concludes that, with respect to AIDS death in the first year of life, the effects of the 076 regimen are a wash in
light of the increased incidence of RPD associated with perinatal exposure to ZDV-approximately four
percent of infants born to HIV-infected women will die in the first year of life, irrespective of whether the
women receive the 076 therapy or not. Id. at 109. Combination therapy after birth mitigates the
disproportionate incidence of RPD among ZDV-exposed children, however. Id. at 106.
65. de Souza, supra note 63, at 154.
66. Huiman X. Barnhart, Natural History of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Disease in Perinatally
Infected Children: An Analysis from the Pediatric Spectrum of Disease Project, 97 PEDIATRICS 710, 713 (1996).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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HIV 70 The AAP counsels that all HIV-exposed infants should receive the
postpartum portion of the 076 regimen for the first six weeks of life. 71 Following
that treatment, the most emphasized component of care for HIV-exposed infants
is PCP prophylaxis.72 HIV-infected infants face a seven percent to twenty
percent risk of developing PCP in their first year of life73 and have a poor
prognosis after onset of the disease, with a median survival time of nineteen
months after PCP diagnosis. 74 PCP usually occurs between three and six months
of age,75 often at a time when PCR results will fail to identify many HIV-
infected children, 76 so both the CDC and the AAP recommend that health care
providers give all HJV-exposed infants PCP prophylaxis beginning at no later
than six weeks of age. 77 Prophylaxis may reduce the incidence of PCP in HV-
infected infants to four percent, compared with an overall incidence of 11.8% to
twenty-nine percent occurring in the absence of preventive care.78
The CDC also recommends that combination antiretroviral therapy be
initiated in HIV-infected infants as soon as their infection status is confirmed.79
As the appropriate combination of antiretroviral drugs for treatment of HIV-
infected infants is still somewhat controversial" and may vary with a particular
infant's immunologic function and clinical condition, the AAP does not
recommend a particular regimen but rather suggests case-by-case consultation
81
with a pediatric HIV expert.
70. See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 60, at 916 (American Academy of Pediatrics
pediatric AIDS treatment guidelines calling for treatment of all HIV-exposed infants beginning as soon as
exposure has been identified); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1995 Revised Guidelines for
Prophylaxis Against Pneumosystis carinii Pneumonia for Children Infected with or Perinatally Exposed to
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 2 (RR-4 1995) (CDC PCP
prophylaxis guidelines calling for identification of all HIV-exposed infants either before or immediately
following birth).
71. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 60, at 910.
72. PCP is the most commonly reported opportunistic infection in children with AIDS, representing
thirty-four percent of all pediatric AIDS cases and 57.3% of pediatric AIDS cases diagnosed in children under
one year of age. Rogers, supra note 16, at 16.
73. R.J. Simonds et al., Pneumocystis carinii Pneumonia Among US Children with Perinatally Acquired
HIVInfection, 270 JAMA 470, 472 (1993).
74. Id. at 473.
75. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 70, at 2.
76. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
77. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 60, at 910; Centers for Disease Control, supra note 70,
at 5.
78. Donald M. Thea et al., Benefit of Primary Prophylaxis Before 18 Months of Age in Reducing the
Incidence of Pneumocystis carinii Pneumonia and Early Death in a Cohort of 112 Human Immunodeficiency
irus-Infected Infants, 97 PEDIATRICS 59, 61 (1996).
79. Luzuriaga & Sullivan, supra note 23, at 18.
80. A number of studies are in progress examining the safety and antiretroviral activity of various
combination therapies for use in infected infants. The appropriate dosage for infant use of a number of
antiretroviral drugs is not well established. Id. at 18.
81. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 60, at 913-14. In addition to PCP prophylaxis and early
initiation of combination therapy, the AAP also recommends a slightly altered vaccination schedule and diet, as
well as regular monitoring of the immune system, for all HrV-exposed infants to continue if and until negative
serostatus is confirmed. Id.
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II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CONTROLLING WOMEN'S
CHILDBEARING
A. STATE REPRODUCTIVE POLICIES TARGETING POOR WOMEN OF
COLOR AND DISABLED WOMEN
Given the demographic characteristics of HIV-infected women in the United
States,82 any state policy aimed at reducing the rate of perinatal HIV
transmission and/or improving health outcomes for HIV-infected newborns will
have a disproportionate impact on poor women of color and their children. State
intervention in the childbearing and childrearing decisions of these women
should be analyzed not only in the context of a modem public health crisis, but
also must be viewed with an eye toward the extensive history of state efforts to
control childbearing by women who are poor, disabled,83 or of color.
The state has played a coercive role in African-American women's
reproduction since the time of slavery,84 and has frequently engaged in direct
efforts to control childbearing by women of color and/or low socioeconomic
status. For example, in the early twentieth century, eugenicist ideology in the
United States gave rise to public policies that embraced the belief that social
problems such as poverty and disease could be solved by preventing targeted
groups from reproducing. 85 Many states passed laws mandating sterilization of
the disabled, individuals with syphilis, and prostitutes. 86 The Supreme Court
upheld one such law in Buck v. Bell,87 and affirmed a lower court's order
directing the sterilization of a "feeble minded" woman. The Court, relying on a
finding that Carrie Buck was "the probable potential parent of socially
inadequate offspring," stated that "[i]t is better for all the world, if ... society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. ' 88
82. See supra note 4.
83. Although HIV-infected individuals generally experience a long period averaging seven to eleven
years during which their infection is asymptomatic, it is appropriate to consider all HIV-infected women as
disabled at least in the context of policies targeting perinatal transmission. An asymptomatic HIV-infected
woman may transmit the HIW virus to her fetus during gestation, labor or delivery, or through breastfeeding.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text. It is this ability to transmit the disease from mother to infant that
makes disabled women the target of state reproductive controls. Cf Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205-06 (1927)
(upholding constitutionality of Virginia law authorizing the sterilization of individuals with hereditary forms of
insanity or imbecility). The Supreme Court has determined that asymptomatic HIW infection is a disability
under the ADA because it is a physical condition affecting reproduction and childbearing. See Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1998).
84. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 22-55 (1997).
85. See id. at 56; Suzanne Sangree, Control of Childbearing by HITV-Positive Women: Some Responses to
Emerging Legal Policies, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 309, 320 (1993).
86. Sangree, supra note 85, at 320-21.
87. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Although Buck v. Bell has never been expressly overruled, its continued vitality
is highly questionable in light of Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner, the Court recognized a
right to procreate and found that the forced sterilization of habitual criminals violated the equal protection
clause. Id. at 541-42.
88. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
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Between 1907 and 1945, 45,000 people were involuntarily sterilized in the
United States, most of them poor women.
89
After World War II, eugenic sterilization laws fell into disuse, were judicially
invalidated, or were repealed. 90 Sterilization abuse continued, however, generally
characterized by economic coercion directed at poor women of color.9' In 1974,
a federal district court judge noted
that an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 low-income persons had been sterilized
annually under federally-funded programs.92 The court stated, "[A]n indefinite
number of poor people have been improperly coerced into accepting a
sterilization operation under the threat that various federally supported welfare
benefits would be withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible sterilization.
Patients receiving Medicaid assistance at childbirth are...the most frequent
targets of this pressure . . . . 93 Doctors in public hospitals have refused to
provide care to poor pregnant women unless they consent to sterilization, 94 or
have obtained "consent" from women while they were in labor.95 In other
documented cases, medical residents have forced women of color to undergo
tubal ligations and hysterectomies so they could practice performing those
procedures.9 6
In light of this history of reproductive coercion directed at disabled women
and poor women of color, which continued uninterrupted in the United States up
to the onset of the AIDS epidemic,97 there is reason to be suspicious of state
efforts to limit or otherwise control the reproductive rights of HIV-infected
pregnant women.98 Purported scientific bases for these controls cannot be
accepted at face value, but rather must be examined critically to determine
whether public health concerns can truly justify the public policies claimed to
89. Sangree, supra note 85, at 322-23.
90. Id. at 323.
91. Joelle S. Weiss, Comment, Controlling H1V-Positive Women's Reproductive Destiny. A Critical
Equal Protection Analysis, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 643, 662-64 (1992).
92. Relfv. Wienberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated as moot by 565 F.2d 722 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
93. Id.
94. E.g., id. (citing case of one plaintiff whose Medicaid doctor conditioned care on consent to
sterilization). See also Sangree, supra note 85, at 324.
95. Sangree, supra note 85, at 325.
96. Taunya Lovell Banks, Women and AIDS-Racism, Sexism and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 351, 361 (1989/1990).
97. In response to documented instances of sterilization abuse such as those discussed in text
accompanying notes 92-96 supra, regulations were adopted requiring written informed consent and a waiting
period when federal funds were used to pay for sterilization. Even after these regulations were issued, however,
a study conducted in 1981 indicated that thousands of poor women of color continued to be sterilized without
their informed consent. Banks, supra note 96, at 362. With the development of long-acting contraceptives such
as Norplant, state policymakers may have found a way to avoid controversial sterilization practices while still
exerting control over women's childbearing. Many state legislators have proposed bills providing financial
bonuses to encourage welfare recipients to use Norplant or conditioning benefits on implantation. ROBERTS,
supra note 84, at 108-112. Welfare recipients are disproportionately women of color. Id.
98. Sangree, supra note 85, at 332; Banks, supra note 96, at 363. See Weiss, supra note 91, at 666-67
(noting that prior reproductive coercion by state sets precedent for future implementation of coercive policies
targeting HIV-infected women).
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follow from them.99 As the eugenics movement demonstrates, a vocal body of
medical experts can develop a public consensus around the idea of combating
social problems not at their roots, but at the microlevel of women's wombs.
100
Particularly if the women at issue are poor, of color and disabled, society has
been only too ready to identify them as the source of larger problems and
therefore appropriate objects of state reproductive coercion. 101
B. THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURYRISE OF FETAL RIGHTS
Beginning soon after the Supreme Court's 1973 decision Roe v. Wade,102 a
number of legal scholars began to develop theories of fetal rights that provided
doctrinal underpinnings to support the state's historical suspicion of women's
childbearing decisions, and that attempted to recast this suspicion as an exercise
in justice and morality.103 Fetal rights theorists advocate extensive control of
women's behavior during pregnancy, including forced diagnosis and treatment
of conditions potentially harmful to the fetus. 10 4 They also urge the recognition
of a cause of action against the mother for prenatal injuries, 1°5 and do not shy
away from the criminalization of certain maternal behavior harmful to the
fetus. 1
06
The policies advocated by fetal rights proponents represent a significant
move away from existing legal doctrine. While the common law has recognized
fetuses as beings with certain legal rights and protections in very narrowly
defined circumstances for quite some time, 10 7 the fetus has never been treated as
99. Sangree, supra note 85, at 332.
100. Id.
101. See ROBERTS, supra note 84, at 3; Jennifer Sinton, Rights Discourse and Mandatory HIV Testing of
Pregnant Women and Newborns, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 187, 237-38 (1997).
102. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
103. E.g., Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEG. MED. 63 (1984);
Jeffrey A. Parness, The Duty to Prevent Handicaps: Laws Promoting the Prevention of Handicaps to
Newborns, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 431 (1983); Jeffrey A. Pamess & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not To Be:
Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982); Carol Ann Simon, Parental
Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 47 (1978); Beverly I. Chernaik, Recovery for
Prenatal Injuries: The Right of the Child Against Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 582 (1976).
104. E.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 443-50 (1983).
105. E.g., Shaw, supra note 103 (arguing that parents should face tort liability and wrongful life claims
for breach of legal duty to care for the fetus); Simon, supra note 103 (advocating tort liability of parent to child
for prenatal injuries); Chemaik, supra note 103 (recommending that mothers be held liable for gross negligence
toward fetus in utero).
106. E.g., Andre A. Panossian et al., Criminalization ofPerinatal HIV Transmission, 19 J. LEG. MED.
223, 255 (1998) (advocating prosecution of perinatal transmission of H1V as assault under existing criminal
statutes); Shaw, supra note 103 (urging prosecution of fetal abuse under child abuse laws).
107. For example, under the common law, a fetus could be named an heir in a will. However, the
property rights so specified did not vest until live birth. Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of
Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest, " 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 730 (1986).
Beginning in 1946, courts began to allow recovery for tortious injury to a fetus subsequently born alive. See
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). Prior to the Bonbrest decision, courts uniformly denied
recovery for fetal injuries and conditioned recovery in a wrongful death action on the live birth of the fetus.
Nelson at 733. Similarly, the criminal law historically did not recognize the killing of an unborn fetus as a
homicide, and only recently has this begun to change. The most famous example of this shift in the criminal
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a person under common law.1°8 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that
fetuses are not constitutional persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.'0 9 Fetal
rights, when recognized by the law, generally have been contingent upon live
birth and only enforceable against third parties. 110 Furthermore, even when
courts began to recognize fetal rights in the absence of live birth, for example,
allowing parental recovery in wrongful death actions for the loss of an expected
child or criminal prosecutions for feticide, the purpose was to compensate and
protect expectant parents."' The law traditionally has not viewed the fetus as an
entity separate from the pregnant woman, but rather has sought to protect born
persons, including the parents and the child born subsequently. Under this
approach, the interests of parents and child are seen as unified.
1 12
Although generally read as a decision promoting women's rights, Roe v.
Wade also provided the doctrinal launching pad for the law's shift toward a
broader vision of fetal rights that creates an adversarial relationship between the
pregnant woman and her fetus. In setting limits on the power of the state to
prohibit abortion, the Roe Court afforded legal status to the state's "important
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life,"' 1 3 separate
and distinct from the state's established interest in preserving and protecting the
pregnant woman. 114 This state interest in the potentiality of life provides the
legal basis for state interference in women's childbearing decisions," 5 and
animates fetal rights advocates' proposals for extensive state regulation of
pregnant women's behavior and health care decisions." 6  Theorists" 7  and
courts 118 relying on the state's interest in potential life to justify state
interventions as drastic as compelled surgery on pregnant women for the benefit
of the fetus typically have not felt constrained by the critical limit Roe places on
the state's interest in the fetus, namely an overriding emphasis on the mother's
law is the California legislature's reaction to the California Supreme Court's decision in Keeler v. Superior
Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970), in which the court held that a fetus was not a "human being" for purposes of
the state murder statute. The legislature responded by adding "a fetus" to the list of possible murder victims
specified in the statute. Nelson at 731.
108. Nelson, supra note 107, at 738. As the Supreme Court stated in Roe, "the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense." Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
109. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
110. Dawn E. Johnson, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights. Conflicts with Women s Constitutional Rights
to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600-01 (1986).
Ill. Id. at 603.
112. Id. at 602.
113. Roe, 410U.S. at 162.
114. Nelson, supra note 107, at 740.
115. Id. at 740-41.
116. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions. What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 17 (1987); Nelson, supra note 107, at 741.
117. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 104, at 437-450 (advocating extensive state management of
women's pregnancies, including prohibitions of behavior dangerous to the fetus and mandatory prenatal
diagnosis and in utero fetal therapy).
118. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam)
(compelling a pregnant woman to undergo cesarean section, despite religious objections, to protect the health of
her fetus).
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life and health." 9 Rather, fetal rights advocates often assert that pregnant women
lose their right to bodily integrity once they decide to carry their pregnancies to
term and waive the abortion right recognized in Roe.'
20
Fetal rights rhetoric has a number of implications for state regulation of HIV-
infected pregnant women's childbearing decisions. Most obviously, if accepted,
fetal rights arguments would gut any possible objection to current proposals for
mandatory HIV testing of all pregnant women without consent. 121 What receives
less attention are the possible implications of a positive HIV test result under a
fetal rights rubric. HIV testing only provides information about a pregnant
woman's serostatus, and standing alone does nothing to improve the woman's
health or prevent perinatal transmission to her fetus. 122 A positive test result only
benefits the fetus if the mother chooses to undergo medical therapy
recommended to prevent perinatal HIV transmission, or if the state compels her
to do so. 123 Fetal rights advocates would have no qualms about compelling all
HIV-infected pregnant women to undergo such therapy. 124
Furthermore, although modem fetal rights rhetoric argues for increased state
intervention in the lives of pregnant women without any explicit reference to
race or class, there is little reason to believe that beneath the surface the fetal
rights movement is a different animal than other campaigns for state intervention
in the childbearing decisions of poor women of color that have occurred
repeatedly in one form or another throughout American history. A study
conducted in the mid-1980s looked at compelled medical treatment of pregnant
women that had been ordered by courts in the name of fetal rights.' 25 In the vast
majority of cases, the women forced by the state to undergo medical treatment
for the benefit of their fetuses were women of color. 126 Similarly, current data
suggests that although African-American women and white women are equally
likely to use drugs during pregnancy, African-American women are much more
likely to be reported for their drug use, and a significant majority of the
defendants in recent fetal rights-inspired prosecutions of pregnant drug users
119. Gallagher, supra note 116, at 18; Nelson, supra note 107, at 742.
120. Robertson, supra note 104, at 437.
121. See infra Parts IV and V.
122. Susan J. Levy, The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Testing for Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome-AIDS, 37 EMoRY LJ. 217, 247 (1988).
123. Howard Minkoff & Anne Willoughby, Pediatric HIV Disease, Zidovudine in Pregnancy, and
Unblinding Heelstick Surveys: Refraining the Debate on Prenatal HIV Testing, 274 JAMA 1165, 1167 (1995).
The authors conclude that if the purpose justifying mandatory prenatal testing is universal perinatal therapy to
reduce the risk of HIV transmission to the infant, then therapy would also have to be mandatory in order for the
state purpose to be realized. Id.
124. See supra note 117.
125. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192
(1987).
126. Responding hospitals reported all attempts to obtain court orders for the medical treatment of
pregnant women, eighty-one percent of which were directed against African-American, Asian and Hispanic
women, and twenty-four percent of which involved women who did not speak English as their primary
language. Forty-four percent of the women involved in these attempts were unmarried. Court orders were
granted in eighty-six percent of the reported attempts, usually less than six hours after legal efforts were
initiated. A full nineteen percent of court orders were obtained in less than one hour, often by telephone. Id. at
1193.
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have been African-American. 12 7 Although fetal rights is an equal opportunity
theory in the abstract, in practice it operates primarily as a control on the
childbearing decisions of poor women and women of color, the women most
frequently infected with HIV.
III. PUBLIC HEALTH POLICIES TARGETING HIV INFECTION IN
WOMEN AND NEWBORNS
A. EARLY PROGRAMS ADDRESSING THE REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS
OF HIV-INFECTED WOMEN AND THE FIRST PROPOSALS FOR
SCREENING PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS
1. Counseling HIV-infected women to not have children
Possibly more than any other group affected by HIV, HIV-infected women
are particularly vulnerable to coercive state policies aimed at preventing
transmission of the AIDS virus. HIV-infected women are not merely capable of
infecting others who engage in high-risk behaviors with them; their pregnancies
also are the primary means of transmission to HJV-infected infants, 12 8 who often
are seen as the most innocent victims of AIDS. 129 In fact, much more than men,
HIV-infected women often have been perceived only as vectors of perinatal
transmission, rather than as sick persons with their own health care needs. For
example, women who are not pregnant are frequently excluded from clinical
trials of new HIV medications on grounds that they may become pregnant and
the potential effects of the trial drugs on a fetus are not known. 130 At the same
time, researchers have been highly interested in studying drug therapies that
might prevent perinatal transmission, with the result that almost all women able
to access experimental drug therapies are pregnant.'
3
'
127. African-American women are ten times more likely to be reported for drug use during pregnancy
than white women, despite similar rates of drug use, and seventy percent of state prosecutions for drug use
during pregnancy involve African-American defendants. ROBERTS, supra note 84, at 172-75.
128. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
129. E.g., Madison, supra note 5, at 385-86 ("HIV infection often results from carelessness and
promiscuity. While adults may take precautions against this disease by using condoms and not sharing drug
needles, many choose not to do so. Newborns, on the other hand, cannot make this choice, and they end up
paying the price for their mothers' illicit behavior.").
130. Sinton, supra note 101, at 233. In other instances, women have been told they must be sterilized or
use Norplant in order to participate in clinical trials. Elizabeth B. Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing of
Pregnant Women and Newborns Must Fail: A Legal, Historical, and Public Policy Analysis, 3 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 16 (1996). Women historically have been underrepresented in HIV clinical trials, most likely
as a result of this policy of excluding childbearing women. For example, by the end of 1990, only 6.7% of
ACTG participants were women, whereas women represented 9.8% of AIDS cases diagnosed in the United
States. Liza Solomon & Sylvia Cohn, Access to, and Utilization of Health Services for HIV-Infected Women, in
HIV, AIDS AND CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES, supra note 4, at 96, 102.
131. In 1991, only 8.3% of women enrolled in ACTG trials were not pregnant. Solomon & Cohn, supra
note 130, at 102. HIV-infected women's inability to access HIV drugs is not limited to the clinical trial setting,
either. Prior to the publication of the ACTG 076 results, symptomatic H1V-infected men were three times more
likely than symptomatic HIV-infected women to be offered ZDV treatment, and consequently survived
significantly longer after an AIDS diagnosis than did their female counterparts. Id. at 97-98; see also Lois
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Given this focus on women as potential producers of HIV-infected infants, it
is not surprising that public health officials focused on the transmission risk
HIV-infected women posed to their children long before addressing other issues
affecting HIV-infected women and their families. 132 In 1985, when there were no
known therapies for reducing the risk of perinatal HIV transmission, the CDC
published guidelines recommending that HIV-infected women be advised to
"delay" pregnancy. 133 The health departments of forty-nine states similarly
advised that HIV-infected women should be counseled to avoid pregnancy.134
Although these public recommendations only addressed directly those
reproductive decisions women made prior to pregnancy, they clearly signaled
that HIV-infected women who became pregnant should choose abortion over
childbirth. 135 Health care providers picked up on this signal, as indicated by
striking anecdotal evidence that pregnant HJV-infected women frequently were
pressured by doctors to terminate their pregnancies. 
136
Eldred & Richard Chaisson, The Clinical Course of HIV Infection in Women, in HIV, AIDS AND
CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES, supra note 4, at 15, 19 (reporting that median survival time in
persons receiving ZDV was 770 days after AIDS diagnosis compared to 190 days in persons not receiving
ZDV); Jeffrey T. Berger et al., The Ethics of Mandatory HIV Testing in Newborns, 7 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 77, 80
(1996) (noting HIV-infected women less likely to be offered ZDV than HIV-infected men); Thomas C. Quinn,
Screening for HIVInfection-Benefits and Costs, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 486, 486 (1992) (attributing women's
shorter survival time after AIDS diagnosis to their differential use of ZDV).
132. For example, the CDC published the first of a series of guidelines regarding H1V infection and
pregnancy in 1985. Taunya Lovell Banks, Legal Challenges: State Intervention, Reproduction, and HIV-
Infected Women, in HIV, AIDS AND CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES, supra note 4, at 143. In
contrast, it was not until 1993, and then only in response to a class action lawsuit, that the CDC's AIDS
definition was changed to include opportunistic infections and other diseases commonly found in women with
AIDS. Sinton, supra note 101, at 232. Access to health care and social services for the families of HIV-infected
women in many cases was limited by their inability to receive an AIDS diagnosis under the earlier guidelines,
which emphasized diseases frequently affecting HIV-infected men. Cooper, supra note 130, at 15; see also
Karen K. Rothenberg, Reproductive Choice and Reality: An Assessment of Tort Liability for Health Care
Providers and Women with HIV/AIDS, in HIV, AIDS AND CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES,
supra note 4, at 178 (discussing public focus on limiting childbearing by HIV-infected women to prevent
pediatric AIDS rather than on health and well-being of infected women).
133. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Current Trends and Recommendations for Assisting in
the Prevention of Perinatal Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IlLymphadenopathy-
Associated Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 721
(1985). The American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology (ACOG) seconded this recommendation in 1987,
stating that HIV-infected women "should be strongly encouraged not to become pregnant." Rothenberg, supra
note 132, at 186 (quoting American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Prevention of Human
Immunodeficiency Krus Infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, ACOG COMMITTEE STATEMENT
NO. 53 (1987)). The editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) also counseled that
"persons carrying the AIDS virus should not become pregnant." George Lundberg, The Age of AIDS. A Great
Time for Defensive Living, 253 JAMA 3440, 3440 (1985).
134. M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Counseling and the Problem of Autonomy-Negating Influence, in HIV,
AIDS AND CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES, supra note 4, at 257, 297 n.7.
135. Id. at 258.
136. Sangree, supra note 85, at 342-43. For example, two doctors in a prenatal clinic in Minnesota
aggressively counseled an HIV-infected Native American woman to have an abortion. One doctor falsely told
her that her baby would certainly develop AIDS and die within the first year. The second doctor asked her,
"Who do you think you are to bring a baby into this world only to watch it suffer and die?" Id. Similarly, a
complaint filed in New York state court alleged that doctors at Jamaica Hospital refused to provide prenatal
care to an HIV-infected woman who wanted to continue her pregnancy after being counseled "that she would
be wrong not to give up the baby to abortion, and that she would be adding another burden to society to have
this child." Rothenberg, supra note 132, at 186-87 (discussing allegations of complaint filed in Doe v. Jamaica
Hospital).
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Despite the widespread adoption of the CDC's 1985 guidelines, the
incidence of perinatally-acquired AIDS continued to increase, 137 most likely as a
consequence of two independent factors. First, many HI V-infected women
ignored physicians' pressure to abort and instead chose to continue their
pregnancies at rates similar to those found in groups of uninfected women.
138
Doctors' admonitions regarding the risk of giving birth to an "AIDS baby" did
not resonate as anticipated among HIV-infected women facing intimate
decisions about whether to have a child. 139
Second, efforts to reduce the perinatal transmission of HIV also were
undermined by the health care system's failure to identify significant numbers of
HIV-infected pregnant women, thereby missing many of the intended targets of
its anti-childbearing message. The prevailing policies for HIV testing of
pregnant women were the same as those followed for other adults, and relied on
an individual's willingness to acknowledge high-risk behaviors and come
forward for testing. 14  Beginning in 1988, the CDC conducted an anonymous
serosurveillance survey to monitor the incidence of HIV infection in
childbearing women, 141 and for the first time data became available that did not
Ironically, those HIV-infected women who elect to have an abortion also face significant obstacles to
effecting their reproductive decisions, due to the fact that many abortion providers refuse to treat HIV-infected
women. A survey of New York City abortion clinics revealed that sixty-four percent refused to schedule an
appointment for an HIV-infected woman to get an abortion. Carol Beth Barnett, The Forgotten and Neglected:
Pregnant Women and Women of Childbearing Age in the Context of the AIDS Epidemic, 23 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 863, 893 (1993). Even when an HIV-infected woman freely chooses to terminate her pregnancy and
locates an abortion provider willing to treat her, she is not necessarily ensured of avoiding reproductive
coercion. In one example, an abortion provider in South Carolina conditioned treatment on obtaining the
"consent" of two HIV-infected women to permanent sterilization to prevent future pregnancies. Sangree, supra
note 85, at 342.
137. The incidence of perinatally-acquired HIV infection continued to increase until 1992. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
138. Jean Anderson, Gynecological and Obstetrical Issues for HIV-Infected Women, in HIV, AIDS AND
CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES, supra note 4, at 31, 42. In a recent study of pregnant IDUs,
fifty percent of those who were HIV-infected chose to have an abortion, compared to forty-four percent of those
who were not infected with HIV. Peter A. Selwyn et al., Knowledge of HIV Antibody Status and Decision to
Continue or Terminate Pregnancy Among Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA 3567, 3568 (1989).
139. Commentators on this subject believe that the childbearing decisions of HIV-infected women often
turn not on knowledge of their HIV status but on cultural, social, religious and personal norms that place an
extremely high value on motherhood. "[R]eproduction, babies, and motherhood serve as the only means by
which some women, especially poor, minority women, can achieve a sense of self-identity, self-expression, and
self-esteem." Weiss, supra note 91, at 673; see also Carol Levine & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Uncertain Risks
and Bitter Realities: The Reproductive Choices of HIV-Infected Women, 68 MILBANK Q. 321, 332-337 (1990)
(citing the significance of pronatalist ideologies and cultural value of reproduction in poor minority
communities affected by HIV). HIV-infected intravenous drug users also may choose to continue their
pregnancies as an expression of rehabilitation and lifestyle change. Selwyn, supra note 138, at 3570.
140. Sheldon A. Landesman et al., Serosurvey of Human Immunodeficiency irus Testing Infection in
Parturients, 258 JAMA 2701, 2701 (1987).
141. Under this program, dried blood samples collected from all newborns in forty-four states, the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico were tested for HPV after the removal of personal identifiers.
Demographic data such as the mother's race and geographic region of residence were retained. The survey
relied on antibody testing, so the results indicated HIV infection in the mother, not the infant. The information
provided by the survey was considered to be particularly valuable because it provided a snapshot of the level of
HIV infection that cut across geographical, socioeconomic, ethnic and age lines. John M. Naber & David R.
Johnson, Mandatory HIV Testing in State Newborn Screening Programs, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 55, 58-59 (1992-
1993). The survey was terminated in 1995. See generally supra note 42.
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rely on targeted testing. Researchers were able to compare the number of HIV-
infected pregnant women identified prior to childbirth by targeted testing with
the number of HIV-infected women the serosurveillance results indicated
actually gave birth. They found that existing risk factor-based testing policies
were not capturing a significant number of HIV-infected women. 1
42
2. Shifting the emphasis to prenatal and newborn screening
Faced with growing numbers of HIV-infected women of childbearing age
and HIV-infected children, 143 many public health officials soon came to the
conclusion that the CDC's recommendations for "guiding" the reproductive
decisions of HIV-infected women, when implemented in conjunction with
targeted testing policies, did not go far enough to prevent perinatal
transmission.144 Commentators produced a flurry of proposals for new testing
policies designed to overcome the limitations of targeted testing. The proposals
differed as to the details, but generally called for testing pregnant women
differently than other adults, in an attempt to identify as many HIV-infected
pregnant women as possible prior to childbirth. 145 Some public health officials
believed that all pregnant women should receive HIV counseling and be offered
a test regardless of their stated risk factors; 146 others called for routine mandatory
testing of all pregnant women without counseling or consent.147 In light of the
fact that there was no known therapy for preventing perinatal transmission at the
time these prenatal testing policies were proposed, their implicit purpose was to
identify additional HIV-infected women for directive reproductive counseling,
148
142. Landesman, supra note 140, at 2701. For example, a Brooklyn hospital analyzed 602 newborn
blood samples and researchers found that twelve HIW-infected women were not identified prior to delivery. Id.
143. Throughout most of the 1990s, women were the fastest growing group of H1V-infected persons in
the United States. See Eldred & Chaisson, supra note 131, at 24. The incidence of pediatric AIDS did not peak
until 1992. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Howard L. Minkoff & Sheldon H. Landesman, The Case for Routinely Offering Prenatal
Testing for Human Immunodeficiency V'irus, 159 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 793, 794-95 (1988)
(recommending routine prenatal testing given the failure of targeted counseling and testing); Marcia Angell, A
Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1498, 1499 (1991) (proposing routine, if not
mandatory, testing of all pregnant women and newborns); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 12, at 39-40
(rejecting risk-factor based testing and recommending voluntary HIV screening for all women in geographic
areas with high levels of HIV infection).
145. Id
146. Minkoff& Landesman, supra note 144, at 795.
147. See Angell, supra note 144. Also, evidence indicated that some hospitals were covertly screening
pregnant patients for HIV. Martha A. Field, Pregnancy and AIDS, 52 MD. L. REV. 402, 408 (1993).
148. Directive counseling occurs whenever a patient is urged by her health care provider to exercise one
reproductive option over another. Nancy E. Kass, Reproductive Decision Making in the Context of HIV The
Case for Nondirective Counseling, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION, supra note 54, at 308, 313-
12. Few commentators explicitly advocated directive counseling for abortion as part of their testing policies,
but with no treatment available the only way to prevent transmission was to terminate the pregnancy. Authors
made oblique statements, for example, noting that knowledge of HIV status during a pregnancy "empowers" a
woman to make informed choices about childbearing. Minkoff & Landesman, supra note 144, at 793-94.
However, ifa woman's informed choice was to carry her child to term, she faced the same risk of transmitting
HIV infection to her child perinatally as she did prior to discovering her status. The knowledge only served to
get her to pay more attention to the abortion option.
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i.e., to encourage HIV-infected pregnant women to abort their fetuses. Proposals
also appeared for mandatory HIV testing of all newborns 149 in order to identify
candidates for early medical intervention that would hopefully prevent serious
opportunistic infections and early death.
150
When first proposed, mandatory prenatal and newborn testing was opposed
by many public health officials' 51 and legal writers.' 52 Prenatal testing was
attacked as an impermissible interference with women's reproductive decisions,
particularly as the only way to prevent perinatal transmission at the time was to
avoid childbearing. 153 Directive counseling appeared to many both as racist,
given the demographic makeup of women with HIV-infection, 154 and ethically
questionable, given that most infants born to HIV-infected women would be free
of infection themselves.' 55 Newborn testing faced similar criticism. The tests
clinically available in the late 1980s and early 1990s all tested for HIV
antibodies rather than the presence of the HIV virus, and consequently revealed
the HIV status of the mother rather than the tested infant.156 Furthermore,
although an HIV-infected infant could not be identified until fifteen to eighteen
months of age,157 PCP prophylaxis and other preventive treatment had to be
started much earlier for maximum effectiveness. 58 As a result, even if treatment
were available, the approximately seventy percent of HIV-exposed children who
149. For example, in May 1993 New York State Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn introduced a "Baby
AIDS" bill calling for HIV testing of all newborns in New York State. David Abramson, Passing the Test: New
York's Newborn HIV Testing Policy, 1987-1997, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REDUCING THE ODDS, supra note 4
at 313, 327. The bill generally was described as "unblinding" the blind serosurveillance survey, but as the
identities of subjects in the serosurveillance survey were not known, the proposal actually involved a new
program of mandatory non-anonymous newbom screening. See generally supra notes 42, 141.
150. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 12, at 25.
15 1. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4; Berger et al., supra note 131 at 77; Ana 0. Dumois,
The Case Against Mandatory Newborn Screening for HIV Antibodies, 20 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 143 (1995);
Quinn, Screening for HIV Infection-Benefits and Costs, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 486 (1992); INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, supra note 12.
152. See, e.g., Eileen McKenna, Note, The Mandatory Testing of Newborns for HI: Too Much, Too
Little, Too Late, 13 N.YL. SCH. J. HUM. RIGHTS 307 (1997); Suzanne M. Malloy, Comment, Mandatory HIV
Screening of Newborns: A Proposition Whose ime Has Not Yet Come, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1185 (1996);
Cooper, supra note 130; Linda Farber Post, Note, Unblinded Mandatory HITV Screening of Newborns: Care or
Coercion?, 16 CARDOzO L. REV. 169 (1994); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Non-Anonymous Testing of
Newborns for HIV- Should It Ever Be Allowed?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 373 (1994). But see, e.g., Juliet J.
McKenna, Where Ignorance Is Not Bliss: A Proposal for Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women, 7 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 133 (1996); Leonardo Renna, New York State's Proposal to Unblind HIV Testing for
Newborns: A Necessary Step in Addressing a Critical Problem, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 407 (1994).
153. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 136, at 893.
154. One author noted that many women with chronic diseases are admired for risking their own health
to become pregnant and have a child, citing Julia Roberts' diabetic character in the movie Steel Magnolias as
one well-known, if fictional, example. However, HIV-infected women are considered irresponsible and
condemned for having children. The author concluded that "[slurely class and ethnicity play a role in these
different societal responses and judgments." Levine & Dubler, supra note 139, at 323. See also Banks, supra
note 96, at 383-84 (highlighting racial and class biases in proposals disregarding marginalized women's
interests in the pursuit of public health goals).
155. In the absence of preventive prenatal therapies, sixty-seven percent to eighty-four percent of
children born to HIV-infected women do not contract HIV themselves. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
156. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
157. See id.
158. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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were not HIV-infected would be exposed to unnecessary medical treatment with
unknown long-term consequences for their health.' 59
B. CURRENT POLICIES AND PROPOSALS FOR HIV SCREENING OF
PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS
1. The 1995 Public Health Service recommendations
The publication of the ACTG 076 results and more recent advances in the
science of HIV prevention and treatment' 60 have only sharpened the debate over
appropriate public health policies for HIV screening of pregnant women and
newborns. Discussion has shifted away from counseling H1V-infected women to
avoid pregnancy and now centers on how best to identify HIV-infected women
and children for treatment purposes. 161 The situation for HIV-infected women
and their children appears to be win-win in many respects, as pregnant women
identified through the proposed screening programs can be offered combination
therapies that will both improve their own health and reduce the risk of perinatal
transmission. 162 However, there are a number of reasons HIV-infected pregnant
women may refuse the therapies recommended to them,163 so the threat of
compelled treatment is always lurking, often unacknowledged, in the
background of these proposals. 164 Furthermore, prenatal HIV-testing programs
159. "[PCP prophylaxis is] not without toxicity, and prescribing [it] for all seropositive infants means
that uninfected children would be exposed to substantial toxicity without deriving any medical benefit.
Moreover, the potential long-term toxicity of such exposure is still uncertain, particularly for infants."
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 12, at 27.
160. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing advances in combination therapy and use
of elective cesearean section to reduce perinatal transmission rate to two percent).
161. For example, in 1995 the Public Health Service issued new recommendations on HIV counseling
and testing for pregnant women. See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text. The 1995 recommendations
clearly emphasize preventive therapy. They include no mention of avoiding pregnancy, and can be seen as
implicitly overruling the 1985 CDC guidelines recommending directive counseling. However, some unofficial
moral pressure on HIV-infected women urging them not to reproduce most likely persists. See Rothenberg,
supra note 132, at 178, 197.
162. See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 45, at 1 (noting that combination therapy is standard of
care for all adults and should be continued during pregnancy). Although there is little information available
comparing the effectiveness of combination therapies to the effectiveness of ZDV monotherapy in reducing
perinatal HIV transmission, no increase in the incidence of perinatal transmission has been noted since
combination therapy became the standard of care for HIV-infected women. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text (number ofperinatal AIDS cases has continually declined since 1992 despite increased use
of combination therapy in interim.)
163. A woman could determine that the unknown fetal risks ofperinatal exposure to antiretroviral drugs
makes taking the drugs during pregnancy unacceptable to her. A woman could choose to undergo antiretroviral
therapy or an elective cesarean section, but decide that the burdens or risks of electing both to achieve the
lowest possible risk ofperinatal transmission are too great. In a third example, a woman on Medicaid, who may
have limited access to antiretroviral drugs after she gives birth, may determine that going on antiretrovirals only
for the period of her pregnancy poses an unacceptable risk of developing a resistant virus strain that could
compromise her own health. See R.J. Simonds & Martha Rogers, Preventing Perinatal HlVInfection: How Far
Have We Come?, 275 JAMA 1514, 1514 (1996) (noting that the Health Care Financing Administration requires
state Medicaid programs to cover the cost of ZDV to prevent perinatal transmission but is silent on funding for
antiretrovirals for women who are not pregnant).
164. See supra notes 122-124.
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do not guarantee access to the therapies most frequently recommended for HIV-
infected pregnant women. 165 For their part, newborn testing policies enter the
picture too late to prevent perinatal transmission, and shift resources away from
prenatal interventions that may directly benefit both the mother and child. 166
Perhaps because of these issues, there is significant consensus in the medical
community that HIV testing of pregnant women and newborns should be
implemented on a voluntary basis. 167 In 1995, after the publication of the ACTG
076 results, the Public Health Service issued HIV guidelines recommending
universal counseling and voluntary testing of all pregnant women "so that
interventions to improve the woman's health and the health of her infant can be
offered in a timely and effective manner."168 The PHS proposed voluntary, as
opposed to mandatory testing, because of the importance of a good relationship
between a woman and her health care provider to the woman's adherence to a
complex drug therapy; concem that mandatory testing might deter women from
seeking prenatal care; the possibility that in some cases the risks of testing
positive, including discrimination and domestic violence, might outweigh the
benefits; and evidence indicating high test acceptance rates in universal
voluntary testing programs.169 The PHS guidelines recognize that treatment
decisions are complex and advise that discussions of treatment options should be
noncoercive and allow the woman to come to her own decision. 170 PHS
anticipated that most HIV-infected women would be identified prenatally,
allowing for easy identification of HIV-exposed infants and avoiding any need
for a specific proposal regarding newborn testing.171 The vast majority of states
and health care professional organizations followed PHS's lead and adopted
voluntary testing policies. 1
72
165. INSTrTtTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 67 (highlighting access to care as major barrier to further
reduction in perinatal transmission rate).
166. See id. at 33-34.
167. See generally, id. at 69-73.
168. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Public Health Service Recommendations for
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Counseling and Voluntary Testing for Pregnant Women, 44 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 2 (RR-7 1995). In 1996 amendments to the Ryan White CARE Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
300ff-300ff-I 11 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000), Congress seconded the PHS recommendations on prenatal testing,
making findings that "routine HIV counseling and voluntary testing of pregnant women should become the
standard of care." Congress required all states "to effect regulations or measures to adopt the guidelines issued
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention concerning recommendations for human immunodeficiency
virus counseling and voluntary testing for pregnant women" in order to maintain eligibility for federal financial
assistance for HIV counseling and testing for pregnant women. Id. § 300ff-33(a)-(b).
169. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 168, at 4-6.
170. Id. at 4.
171. Seeid. at5.
172. Four states (Michigan, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas) have routine "opt-out" procedures, under
which a pregnant woman will be tested for HIV unless she specifically objects. Three states (Indiana, New
Jersey, Rhode Island) have routine "opt-in" procedures requiring health care providers to offer an HIV test to
all pregnant women seeking prenatal care. Testing is voluntary with informed consent in the remaining states.
Under state policies and laws, prenatal HIV screening is required in 22 states, routine in 10 states, and
recommended in 18 states. INSTTUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 69-70.
Fewer states have laws or policies addressing newborn HIV testing. Most of these policies are mandatory,
and are discussed below. See infra notes 183-184 and accompanying text. Texas has an "opt-out" newborn
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2. Responses to the PHS guidelines: Voluntary programs are not enough
From certain perspectives, the widespread adoption of voluntary HIV-testing
guidelines has been successful. The incidence of perinatal transmission has
decreased significantly since its peak in 1992, largely due to the increased use of
ZDV and other antiretroviral drugs by HIV-infected women during pregnancy.
173
Depending on the setting, seventy-seven percent to ninety-seven percent of
pregnant women consent to HIV testing when it is offered to them,' 74 and most
HV-infected pregnant women accept antiretroviral therapies recommended to
reduce the risk of perinatal transmission. 175 However, to public health officials
and politicians who see one avoidable case of pediatric AIDS as one too many,
voluntary testing policies are not reducing the national perinatal transmission
rate to the very low number that could be seen if all HIV-positive women were
identified and all received optimal health care during pregnancy 76 Studies
indicate that the most significant obstacle to reaching the lowest possible
perinatal transmission rate is health care providers' failure to implement
universal counseling and voluntary testing guidelines. 177 However, critics of the
testing policy, requiring health care providers to test newborns unless the mother refuses. INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 71.
Until recently, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) recommended routine HIV
counseling of all pregnant women and voluntary testing with informed consent. Id. at 71. The American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), the National Medical Association (NMA), the American Academy of Family
Physicians (AAFP), the American College of Nurse Midwives (ACNM), and the Association of Women's
Health, Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses (AWHONN) all issued similar guidelines. Id. at 72-73. The American
Medical Association (AMA) is the only professional organization that supports mandatory HIV testing of all
pregnant women and newborns. Id. at 72.
173. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
174. Nakchbandi, supra note 36, at 762. For example, eighty-six percent of pregnant women in Texas are
tested for HIV under that state's "opt-out" program described in note 173 supra. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra
note 4, at 96.
175. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 97. A CDC review in four states showed that only five
percent of HIV-infected pregnant women refused ZDV when it was offered. Id. However, success in providing
ZDV treatment varies by state. For example, in New York State, sixty-seven percent of HIV-infected women
received ZDV treatment during pregnancy, whereas ninety-three percent of HIV-infected women used ZDV
prenatally in Michigan. Id. "Barriers to use of ZDV among HIV-infected pregnant women include not having
information about maternal HIV status, late onset of prenatal care, insufficient time to administer ZDV (e.g.,
short labor), and discontinuity of care (e.g., delivery at hospital not associated with prenatal care providers)."
Id.
176. For example, the Institute of Medicine assumed that the risk of transmission under optimal care is
five percent given current medical knowledge. Id. at 104. The Institute of Medicine concluded that the
reduction in perinatal transmission seen since 1992 "is far less than the ACTG 076 findings can offer." Id. at 1.
177. A CDC study evaluating physician compliance with the 1995 Public Health Service
recommendations found that 63.4% to 86.7% of new mothers surveyed recalled discussing HIV testing with
their prenatal health care provider, and fifty-eight percent to 80.7% recalled being tested for HIV during their
pregnancy. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Prenatal Discussion of HIV Testing and Maternal HIV
Testing-14 States, 1996-1997, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 401 (1999). The existence of state
policies and laws requiring counseling and voluntary testing does not appear to have any impact on whether
health care providers actually counsel or offer testing to their pregnant patients. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra
note 4, at 71.
In its recent review of prenatal HIV testing practices, the Institute of Medicine found that many prenatal
care providers were not following the PHS guidelines and concluded that "the most effective single
intervention to reduce perinatal transmission is to increase providers' offering of HIV tests (reduces perinatal
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PHS guidelines generally have focused on the small number of pregnant women
who refuse the test, and conclude that voluntary testing policies are not
enough.1
78
Most political responses to the alleged failure of universal voluntary testing
schemes such as that proposed by PHS have called for mandatory newborn
testing. Congress' 1996 amendments to the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS
Resources Emergency (CARE) Act179 encouraged states to adopt mandatory
newborn testing policies, 180 and recent 2000 amendments reward states who
have mandatory newborn testing policies with preferential funding under the
Act.' 81 Several states have adopted mandatory newborn testing laws, most
notably New York, where a controversial "AIDS Baby" bill passed in June
1996,182 just a month after the 1996 Ryan White CARE Act amendments were
enacted.183 These mandatory newborn testing policies are somewhat bizarre
from a public health standpoint, as newborn testing cannot play any role in
preventing transmission and these testing programs do not respond at all to what
are universally considered the most significant scientific breakthroughs in
HIV transmission by sixteen percent)." Id. at 105. If providers offered antiretroviral treatment to all identified
HIV-infected pregnant women, the transmission rate could be reduced another five percent. Id.
In contrast, the IOM concluded that increasing test acceptance among pregnant women would reduce the
perinatal transmission rate by twelve percent, and increasing HIV-infected women's acceptance of ZDV
treatment would reduce the rate by another five percent. Id.
It should be noted that the IOM's figures may overstate the rate at which providers currently offer HIV
testing to pregnant women, as well as pregnant women's refusal of HIV testing, thereby making the relative
responsibility of health care providers appear smaller than it likely is in practice. The IOM's data showed that
fifty percent to ninety-seven percent of health care providers routinely offered HIV testing to pregnant women.
Id. at 75-84. In its model calculating possible reductions in the perinatal transmission rate, IOM assumed that
seventy-five percent of health care providers routinely offered testing, roughly the midway point in the range it
documented. Id. at 105. In contrast, pregnant women's test acceptance rates range from seventy-seven percent
to ninety-seven percent, see supra note 174 and accompanying text, and the IOM incorporated a number from
the low end of that range (eighty percent) into its model. Id.
178. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 5, at 381-82 (calling for mandatory testing because many mothers
may not consent to testing or treatment).
179. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300ff-300ff- 111 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000). The Ryan White CARE Act supports
medical care and other services for people with HIV or AIDS. Madison, supra note 5, at 382 n. 198.
180. The 1996 amendments to the Act made Ryan White funding to the states after April 2000
contingent on demonstrating one of the following: (1) a fifty percent reduction (or a comparable measure for
states with less than ten cases) in the rate of new AIDS cases resulting from perinatal transmission as compared
to the rate of such cases in 1993; (2) at least ninety-five percent of women in the state who have received at
least two prenatal visits prior to 34 weeks gestation have been tested for HIV; or (3) a program for mandatory
testing of all newborns whose mothers have not undergone prenatal testing. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-34(e)(2). See
also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 16-17 (discussing 1996 amendments to the Ryan White CARE
Act). Having a newbom testing policy was the clearest way for states to maintain funding eligibility, as it
avoided statistical calculations and uncertainties.
181. The 2000 Amendments set aside funding for states that mandate testing of all newborns or,
alternatively, all newborns whose mother's HIV status is not known to the delivering physician. 42 U.S.C.
300ff-33(c)(2)(B) (LEXIS 2001).
182. Abramson, supra note 149, at 335.
183. Connecticut also mandates newbom HIV testing, but waives the requirement in cases of religious
objection. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-55 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000). Texas requires newborn testing unless
the mother refuses for any reason. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 71. At least six other states permit
HIV testing of infant without parental consent, and in two states a health care provider may test a newborn for
HIV if he or she determines it is medically necessary. See id.
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reducing the toll of pediatric AIDS. 184 Mandatory newborn testing laws may be
the result of a political compromise between forces intent on combating pediatric
AIDS and forces attempting to minimize the intrusiveness of testing policies on
the privacy of HIV-infected pregnant women. Other commentators suggest that
these laws, which were in an embryonic stage as early as 1993, simply failed to
adjust to intervening medical discoveries such as the ACTG 076 results enabling
doctors and women to prevent the perinatal transmission of HIV.
185
The public health community generally has ignored politicians' calls for
newborn testing, and recent proposals instead focus their attention on changing
the understanding of what will constitute sufficiently informed consent in the
prenatal HIV testing context. The Institute of Medicine's 1999 report to
Congress on perinatal HIV transmission is the most prominent example of this
approach. The IOM recommends a national policy of universal HIV testing, with
patient notification, as a routine component of patient care. 186 As explained by
the IOM, "'[r]outine with notification' means that the test for HIV would be
integrated into the standard battery of prenatal tests, and that women would be
informed that the HIV test is being conducted and of their right to refuse it.'
18 7
However, under the IOM plan, physicians would no longer provide pretest HIV
counseling to their prenatal patients or even discuss the issue of perinatal HIV
transmission and the potential benefits of knowing the woman's HIV status early
in pregnancy. 188 The IOM developed its proposal largely in response to feedback
that health care providers were failing to comply with the PHS guidelines
because of the time and expense involved in providing standard HIV counseling
to all of their pregnant patients and the administrative burdens of maintaining
confidential HIV records.' 89 Proponents of this "opt-out" approach also defend it
as preserving (in some form) patient consent while shifting the psychological
burden of prenatal HIV testing away from those who now must take affirmative
action to accept the test and toward those who under the IOM proposal will have
to take affirmative action to refuse it.' 90 However, the IOM proposal goes a long
way toward advocating effective mandatory prenatal testing, as under this plan
pregnant women will not be provided with sufficient information about their
IV risk or perinatal transmission to make an informed decision about the
appropriateness of prenatal testing for their situation, and health care providers
will not be subject to any monitoring of whether they obtain even this minimal
consent at all.191 The IOM proposal also fails to address the lurking issues of
184. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 3 3-34.
185. Id. at 34.
186. Id. at 110.
187. Id. ACOG and the AAP have now endorsed the IOM approach by updating clinical practice
guidelines to facilitate universal and routine prenatal HIV testing with patient notification. Marie C.
McCormick et al., Preventing Perinatal Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus in the United States,
94 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 795, 796 (1999).
188. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 110.
189. Id. at85, 111-12.
190. Minkoff& Willouhby, supra note 123, at 1166.
191. See McCormick, supra note 187, at 797-98 (responding to critics of IOM recommendations).
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access to treatment and compelled obstetrical interventions based on positive
11V test results. 1
92
IV. NON-LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING PROPOSED -HV-
SCREENING PROGRAMS FOR PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS
Proposals to screen pregnant women and newborns for HIV infection can be
examined within ethical, public health, and legal frameworks of analysis. Each
of these approaches involves interest balancing, either as a primary matter in
applying the framework 193 or secondarily when comparing the relative merits of
similar proposals. 194 As a result, analysis within each framework tends to
devolve into a policy discussion that transcends the boundaries of any particular
framework. 195 Nevertheless, each perspective highlights particular issues for
consideration and thus contributes to a global analysis of the various proposals.
Applying the different frameworks only to the two proposals currently
garnering the most attention-i.e., routine prenatal MV testing with patient
notification and mandatory newborn testing-ignores the history of these
policies and the directions they will likely take in the future. For example, the
political force behind mandatory newborn testing, coupled with a strong fetal
rights movement and with growing public knowledge of the highly effective
therapies available for reducing the risk of perinatal transmission, soon could
lead to laws mandating prenatal testing,196 a possibility that also will be
discussed. Furthermore, no HIV-testing program will have any effect on health
outcomes unless positive results lead to treatment. Accordingly, issues of access
to care and the potential for compelled treatment of HIV-infected pregnant
women and/or H1V-exposed newborns identified by screening programs also
must be addressed in order to develop a complete picture of the implications of
current testing proposals.
192. See id. at 798.
193. See, e.g. infra note 355 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., infra Part IVA.4. The public health model is indeterminate when comparing mandatory
prenatal screening to a policy of universal screening with consent. Choosing between these two public health
policies therefore involves balancing the pros and cons of the policies against each other in a manner not
explicitly set forth in the public health model itself.
195. Cf Stemlight, supra note 152, at 380 (asserting that constitutional balancing analysis blurs into
policy analysis of whether government can articulate a sufficiently strong interest to justify infringing
individual liberties).
196. In fact, Connecticut recently passed a law requiring H1V testing of all pregnant women receiving
prenatal care. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-90 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000). One of the primary concerns
regarding the IOM's proposal for routine prenatal testing with patient notification is that it will quickly be
translated by health care providers into a system of routine HIV testing without patient consent. See supra note
191 and accompanying text. These concerns are given weight by health care providers' previous reluctance to
invest the time and expense necessary to incorporate HIV counseling into routine prenatal care. See supra note
177 and accompanying text. Compliance with requirements to document prenatal testing may not be
accompanied by meaningful patient notification.
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A. A PUBLIC HEALTH ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCREENING
PROGRAMS
Prenatal and newborn HIV-screening programs would not be unprecedented
in public health terms. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes,
regulations, or policies requiring prenatal or newborn screening for specified
health risks. 19 7 For example, almost all states require prenatal screening for
syphilis, 198 the test for which is generally performed on blood drawn from the
woman for the purpose of conducting a number of prenatal screens, about many
of which she may not be specifically informed.199 Newborns also are subject to
state-mandated screening programs, most commonly for phenylketonuria
(PKU). 20
0
1. The public health framework
20 1At the most basic level, screening programs are acceptable from a public
health standpoint when there is significant potential for individual or public
benefit, and where the harms of a program do not outweigh the benefits. 20 2 In
addition, public health officials have identified a number of characteristics of
successful and well-organized screening programs that provide a more
sophisticated framework of analysis than a straightforward cost-benefit ratio. A
screening program is advisable in public health terms if it meets the following
criteria:
197. Katherine L. Acuff, Prenatal and Newborn Screening: State Legislative Approaches and Current
Practice Standards, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION: TOWARDS A MORALLY ACCEPTABLE PUBLIC
POLICY FOR HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS, supra note 54, at 121.
198. Id. at 122.
199. Consent for various tests involving blood analysis is presumed once a woman has consented to have
blood drawn. Berger, supra note 151, at 78. The doctrine of presumed consent traditionally has not been
applied in the H1V context, largely due to the socioeconomic implications of a positive test result, such as
discrimination and the possible loss of employment, medical insurance, and housing. Id.
200. Acuff, supra note 197, at 123. PKU is a hereditary metabolic disorder that can produce brain
damage resulting in severe mental retardation if left untreated. Retardation can be prevented by early restriction
of dietary phenylalanine, preferably beginning before four weeks of age. Katherine L. Acuff & Ruth R. Faden,
A History of Prenatal and Newborn Screening Programs: Lessons for the Future, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE
NEXT GENERATION: TOWARDS A MORALLY ACCEPTABLE PUBLIC POLICY FOR HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT
WOMEN AND NEWBORNS, supra note 54, at 64. PKU screening is mandatory and occurs without parental
consent in every state except Maryland, which has adopted a voluntary PKU screening scheme. Acuff, supra
note 197, at 123; Neil A. Holtzman et al., Effect of Informed Parental Consent on Mother 's Knowledge of
Newborn Screening, 72 PEDIATRICS 807, 807 (1983).
201. In public health terms, "screening" refers to the application of a test to all individuals in a defined
population. Screening stands in contrast to "testing," which is the application of a test or measurement to
selected individuals for the purpose of identifying a disease or medical condition. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
supra note 4, at 22. All of the current proposals for prenatal and newborn diagnosis of HIV infection are
screening programs because they call for testing all pregnant women and newborns, not just those who exhibit
symptoms or have known risk factors for HIV infection.
202. Ruth R. Faden et al., Warrants for Screening Programs. Public Health, Legal, and Ethical
Frameworks, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION: TOWARDS A MORALLY ACCEPTABLE PUBLIC
POLICY FOR HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS, supra note 54, at 3, 7; Berger, supra note
151, at 78.
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1. The goals of the public health program should be clearly specified and shown
to be achievable.
2. The natural history of the condition should be adequately understood, and
treatment or intervention for those found positive widely accepted by the
scientific and medical community, with evidence that early intervention
improves health outcomes.
3. The screening test should distinguish those individuals who are likely to have
the condition from those who are unlikely to have it.
4. There should be adequate facilities for diagnosis and resources for treatment
for all who are found to have the condition.
5. The test and possible interventions should be acceptable to the affected
population.
6. The cost of case finding, diagnosis, and treatment or intervention should be
economically balanced in relation to the medical cost savings that might result
from the screening program.2 °3
2. Applying the framework to newborn screening
Applying the six criteria to newborn screening for HIV infection, it is
questionable whether newborn screening can be justified in public health terms.
The goal of a newborn screening program presumably is to improve medical
outcomes for HIV-infected infants.204 The natural history of pediatric HIV
infection is well understood, and many interventions for HIV-infected newborns,
such as PCP prophylaxis, are generally accepted in the medical community.2°5
Only the use of specific combinations and dosages of antiretroviral drugs
206appears to be a matter of continuing controversy, but even allowing for that
debate, there appears to be consensus that some form of combination therapy is
advisable for most infants.20 7
Significant questions arise over the matter of testing accuracy, however.
Under most newborn testing programs, an ELISA test will be given shortly after
203. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 23; see also Naber & Johnson, supra note 141, at 57
(outlining simplified version of screening program criteria that does not include social acceptability of
intervention).
204. Newborn screening comes too late to prevent infection of the newborn, see supra note 166 and
accompanying text, and newborns pose no risk of infection to others, see infra note 263 and accompanying
text.
An indirect effect of newborn screening is discovery of the mother's HIV status. See supra notes 57-58. It
cannot credibly be argued, however, that improving medical outcomes for the HIV-infected mothers of tested
newborns is in any meaningful sense one of the goals of newborn screening programs, which ignore the health
of these women until they produce an at-risk child. See also infra note 220. Because of the role parents
generally play in the effective medical treatment of their children, however, proponents of newborn screening
programs must concern themselves with HIV-infected mothers as the "target audience" of any such program,
whose cooperation must be enlisted in order to secure the program's maximum effectiveness. See infra note
218.
205. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 64, 79-81 and accompanying text.
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birth to determine whether an infant is HIV-exposed. 20 8 This test will not reveal
the infant's HV status, but rather will identify infants born to HIV-infected
mothers as candidates for more specific testing. Assuming that the child is still
available for testing when the ELISA test results are returned approximately a
week after birth, 209 an HIV-exposed infant will be tested with PCR, which is
only twenty-five percent to thirty percent accurate at birth.210 PCR testing will
not identify all HIV-infected infants and exclude uninfected infants until six
months of age, again assuming the child has remained available to the health
care provider for follow-up testing. As a result of the limitations of newborn
testing either, under an antibody testing regime, uninfected exposed infants will
be subjected to unnecessary and possibly toxic treatment or, under a virologic
testing regime, a number of HIV-infected infants will not be identified until after
the best opportunity for early intervention has passed.
Access to care also is a potential stumbling block to the effectiveness of a
newborn HIV-screening program. Sixty-six percent of children in the United
States have private medical insurance, and approximately forty-nine percent of
low-income children are covered under the Medicaid program.211 Since children
with HIV infection are disproportionately poor, relatively few of them have
private insurance, but a relatively larger proportion may be eligible for Medicaid
than children found in the general population. 212 Medicaid covers all HIV-related
drugs, but many states have imposed limitations on this benefit by restricting the
number of prescriptions a patient can purchase in a month, limiting the number
of refills, and requiring a determination of "medical necessity. 21 3 Many private
insurers, also, limit coverage for HIV care and have "medical necessity"
214
requirements. It is unclear whether prophylactic treatment for asymptomatic
HIV infection will be deemed medically necessary by public and private
insurers.215
There also is some question as to whether the interventions anticipated by a
newborn HIV-screening program will be acceptable to the "target audience,"
generally their HIV-infected mothers. Many families may object to treating their
HIV-exposed infants with potentially toxic H[V therapies when it is uncertain
whether the infants are infected with HIV or are getting any benefit from the
treatment. Combination therapy is particularly uncertain for infants, as little is
208. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
209. "Reporting of conventional ELISA and Western blot test results generally takes one to two weeks."
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 52.
210. Luzuriaga & Sullivan, supra note 23, at 18.
211. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 58-59.
212. For example, although seventy percent of women of childbearing age in the United States have
private insurance, only fifteen percent of women in care for asymptomatic HIV have private insurance. Id. at
58-59. Sixty percent have public insurance (Medicaid) and twenty-five percent have no insurance. Id.
Assuming that children with perinatally-acquired HIV infection are in the same socioeconomic position as their
mothers, they will disproportionately either have no insurance or be dependent on Medicaid. In fact, Medicaid
pays for the care of ninety percent of children with AIDS diagnoses. Id.
213. Id. at 59-60.
214. Id. at 58.
215. See id.
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known about the appropriate dosage and tolerance in children of drugs that have
21been tested primarily in adults. 16 Finally, newborn HIV screening may be
suspect and resented not only because treatment is controversial and risky, but
also because of its disproportionate effect on poor communities of color. Public
health authorities have engendered controversy and distrust with sickle cell
screening programs in the past for similar reasons, and are wary of programs that
may be ineffective due to public hostility.
217
Only a small proportion of HIV-infected infants will benefit significantly
from early identification and treatment-those who develop a serious, life-
threatening opportunistic infection as their first manifestation of HIV infection.
As the majority of infected infants will exhibit NRDP, they generally will be
diagnosed in the absence of newborn screening as a result of less serious
symptoms and will not see dramatic returns from early treatment. Benefits from
early diagnosis will be further limited if those HIV-infected infants prone to RPD
who are identified through screening do not have access to prophylactic care.
These limited benefits must be compared with potential costs that may be
substantial, given problems of HIV diagnosis and treatment in infants and the
screening program's disproportionate racial and class effects. Although a
comprehensive medical cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this Article,
it is not at all clear that newborn HIV screening is justified in public health
terms.
218
3. Applying the framework to prenatal screening
Although the preventive potential of prenatal HIV screening may make it a
more compelling public health program than newborn screening, prenatal
screening still does not neatly satisfy the accepted criteria for a public health
screening program. In light of the fact that women are not screened until they
become pregnant, it must be assumed that the primary goals of prenatal HIV
screening are to identify HIV-infected women in time to reduce the risk of
transmission to their children, and to identify HIV-exposed children as early as
possible-before birth-for prophylactic treatment beginning soon after the time
of delivery.219
216. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
217. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 23. "In practice, when screening is conducted in
contexts of gender inequality, racial discrimination, sexual taboos, and poverty, these conditions shape the
attitudes and beliefs of health system and public health decision makers as well as patients, including those who
have lost confidence that the health care system will treat them fairly. Thus, if screening programs are poorly
conceived, organized, or implemented, they may lead to interventions of questionable merit and enhance the
vulnerability of groups and individuals." Id. at 21; see also ROBERTS, supra note 84, at 256-58 (discussing
perception in African-American community that sickle cell programs were genocidal, and programs' related
failure); Acuff& Faden, supra note 200, at 67-71 (same).
218. But see Madison, supra note 5, at 363-64 (claiming that newbom HIV screening arguably does
meet public health screening program criteria).
219. A secondary goal of prenatal screening may be to identify HIV-infected women so they can receive
treatment benefiting their own health, but this concern for women's health apparently only becomes compelling
upon pregnancy. It should be noted that the public health model does not provide any basis for normatively
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Perinatal transmission is relatively well understood by the medical
community, but treatment to reduce the risk of transmission from mother to child
has become somewhat controversial with advances in combination therapy. The
ACTG 076 regimen is the only antiretroviral therapy which has been shown to
reduce the risk of perinatal transmission effectively and safely. 220 However,
ZDV monotherapy is no longer the standard of care for pregnant women,
prompting public health officials to recommend the use of combination therapy
during pregnancy both to promote the health of the woman and to reduce the risk
of perinatal transmission.221 The 1998 PHS recommendations raise the concern
that there is now no generally accepted antiretroviral intervention for reducing
the risk of perinatal transmission, as little is known about the appropriate dosage
or long-term effects of perinatal exposure to various combinations of
antiretroviral drugs, nor has their efficacy in preventing perinatal transmission
been demonstrated with any certainty.222 Even assuming these developments
indicate that there is no widely accepted antiretroviral intervention, however, the
recent confirmation of the efficacy of elective cesarean section alone in
significantly reducing the risk of perinatal transmission probably is enough to
satisfy the second public health criterion in the case of prenatal screening.
The third criterion is easily met, as antibody testing is a highly reliable
indicator of HIV infection in adults.223 In contrast, access to treatment upon the
receipt of positive test results probably is the most significant hurdle that
prenatal HIV screening must overcome in order to be justifiable. Well over half
(61.5%) of women in care for HIV are insured by Medicaid, while another
twenty-five percent of women in care for asymptomatic HIV infection have no
224insurance at all. While the federal government requires states to pay for drugs
225to prevent perinatal HIV transmission, there is no guaranteed access to the
most current therapies, such as combination antiretrovirals, and no guarantee of
226continued treatment for the woman after delivery of her child. Furthermore, as
discussed in the context of newborn screening, even women with public or
private insurance may encounter barriers to adequate HIV care, such as insurer
evaluating what the goal(s) of a screening program should be. Instead, it analyzes whether a screening program
can be justified in terms of what its goals actually are. In this regard, the public health model is agnostic on
many of the thornier issues at the core of ethical and legal analyses of newborn and prenatal screening
programs. See, e.g, infra Part IV.A.4.
220. And even under the ACTG 076 regimen, there are still some lingering questions about the long-
term toxicity of ZDV monotherapy. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
223. See generally supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
224. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 59.
225. See supra note 163.
226. If a woman initiates antiretroviral therapy during pregnancy and then goes off antiretroviral drugs
after delivery, it increases the likelihood that she will develop a drug resistant strain of HIV that will later
compromise her own health and treatment. Cf supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of
resistance in the context ofZDV monotherapy).
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determinations that early antiretroviral therapy is not "medically necessary" for
227
asymptomatic IV infection.
There also must be concern that available interventions for prenatally-
diagnosed HIV will not be acceptable to HIV-infected women. Again, although
ZDV monotherapy has been shown to reduce the risk of perinatal transmission
and the majority of studies show no long-term effects from perinatal exposure to
ZDV, this therapy is not optimal for the woman and jeopardizes her own health.
Combination therapy, in contrast, is best for the woman but poses unknown risks
to the fetus. Furthermore, outside the context of H1V, many women have
objected to elective cesarean sections recommended for the sake of fetal
health,228 and there is no reason to believe that the procedure will be any more
acceptable to HV-infected women faced with a similar risk to their child's
health. Finally, the mere existence of prenatal screening programs for HIV
infection may alienate the target population, which may perceive an invidious
purpose behind the disproportionate gender, racial and socioeconomic impacts of
229screening.
The cost-benefit calculations underlying prenatal HIV screening are unclear,
and in any event a precise monetary calculation of the value of lives saved is
beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, some general observations can be
made. The potential benefits of prenatal HIV screening are dramatic-once a
pregnant woman is identified as HIV-infected, treatment can significantly reduce
the risk that her child also will be infected with WV. Prevention represents a life
of illness avoided, rather than merely a life of chronic illness possibly prolonged
by early newborn identification.230 These benefits only are attainable, however,
if the woman chooses treatment and has access to care.
4. State coercion and the limits of the public health framework
Public health screening programs can be completely mandatory, completely
voluntary or, like "routine with notification," lie somewhere between the two
extremes. 231 Even assuming that either prenatal or newborn W1V testing clearly
satisfied all six criteria for an ideal public health screening program, the criteria
do not reveal whether the screening program should be mandatory or voluntary.
For example, if we assume a prenatal HIV-testing regime in which access to
227. See supra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
228. See generally Kolder, supra note 125.
229. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 217, at 23 and accompanying text. Although the fact that all
pregnant women will be screened is designed in part to mitigate the patient's sense of being singled out as a
likely victim of HIV infection, the women who will be forced through screening to identify themselves as HIV-
infected and who will face state pressure to consent to treatment will be overwhelmingly poor women of color.
See McCormick, supra note 187, at 795.
230. It should be noted that prenatal screening also achieves the objective of early newborn identification
in the minority of cases where prenatal treatment fails to prevent perinatal transmission. A child born to a
mother known to be HIV-infected will be monitored for HIV-exposure and possible infection from the moment
of birth.
231. Faden, supra note 202, at 4.
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prenatal and postpartum care for both mother and child were guaranteed, it is
almost certain that prenatal screening could be justified within the public health
framework. Tinkering with the consent scenario may produce subtle variations in
criteria satisfaction, but generally will do so to inconclusive effect.232 Even if
such tinkering in a specific case clearly indicated that either voluntary or
mandatory testing was preferable under the criteria, this answer would remain
unsatisfying as the criteria only get at the issue of consent indirectly at best, and
it is unclear what role it is intended to play in the public health paradigm.
Accordingly, although the public health criteria provide a necessary medical
starting point for an analysis of prenatal and newborn HIV-screening programs,
the criteria alone cannot provide an answer to the question of whether state
coercion in this area is justified.
B. AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCREENING PROGRAMS
Ethics fills in many of the gaps left by the public health model. While the
public health framework of analysis provides important insight into the concrete
medical benefits to be gained and implementation obstacles to be faced by any
newborn or prenatal HIV-screening program, it leaves many of the hardest
questions surrounding these programs unanswered. Ethical analysis, in contrast,
with its emphasis on principles such as beneficence, respect for autonomy, and
justice, allows for an examination of a number of controversial issues that the
public health model avoids altogether. These issues include how to evaluate what
233the goals of a screening program should be, and how to balance autonomy
concerns against medical outcomes when it is argued that allowing for consent
will undermine a program's efficacy.
1. Beneficence
The ethical principle most closely associated with public health matters is
beneficence, which is concerned with issues of human health and well-being.234
Beneficence encompasses a duty to confer benefits and to prevent and remove
harms, as well as a duty to balance possible benefits against possible harms of an
action.235 In the context of IV-screening programs, both the state and pregnant
women may have ethical duties under the beneficence principle.
Most public health programs are both motivated and justified by the state's
duty to promote the welfare of the community, a duty which may be furthered by
236the prevention or treatment of disease. On the community level, prevention
232. For example, routine prenatal screening may identify with more accuracy all HIV-infected pregnant
women because doctors will be more likely to perform the test than under a voluntary program, but the
acceptability of the program may decline as it becomes more coercive.
233. See supra note 219.




Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
will decrease the incidence of HIV disease and will reduce the social costs of
providing care for those who do become infected.237 The government may
prevent perinatal transmission of HIV by reducing the number of births to HV-
infected women or by providing and/or compelling treatment that has been
shown to reduce the risk of transmission. The product of testing-knowledge of
one's HIV status-alone does nothing to accomplish the objective of prevention.
The government must rely on the goodwill of HIV-infected women or take
further coercive action against them in order to prevent perinatal transmission.
238
The government arguably also has an ethical duty to reduce the severity of
HIV-related illness for those affected. Improved treatment benefits not only
affected citizens, but also society as a whole, to the extent that reduced medical
239
expenses and increased social productivity exceed the cost of treatment.
However, again, HIV test results do not lead inexorably to treatment. HIV-
infected persons must consent to care and have access to it, or the state must
compel treatment on the basis of test results.
For her part, an WIV-infected woman has an ethical duty not to harm her
children, either by exposing them to toxic drugs during pregnancy, transmitting
to them a chronic and eventually fatal disease, or by leaving them without family
care when her own death and disability may prevent her from parenting.240 She
also has a duty to provide her children with adequate medical treatment if they
are ill. However, the principle of beneficence generally does not require her to
compromise her own health or well-being for the sake of her children's.
241
Furthermore, to the extent that not giving birth at all is the only certain way to
prevent perinatal transmission, the calculus of comparing possible benefits to
possible harms becomes indeterminate. Most children infected with HIV live
relatively normal childhoods, marked by an illness that is chronic but only
242
mildly symptomatic for extended periods of time. It is difficult to argue that
237. Id. at 23. HIV infection and AIDS present social costs related to their disproportionate burden on
shared resources.
238. One may argue, of course, that the state also has an interest in determining the H1L status of
pregnant women so as to reduce the risk of transmission to third parties other than the women's children.
However, this more general prevention goal in no way justifies a testing program exclusively targeting pregnant
women, who are no more likely than non-pregnant women or men to transmit HIV infection to adult third
parties. Furthermore, just as with perinatal transmission, knowledge of HIV infection alone does nothing to
prevent transmission to third-party adults. The state still would have to rely on the goodwill of the HIV-infected
women identified through testing, or take further coercive action to prevent transmission to others.
239. Cf INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 112 (constructing cost-benefit model for prenatal HIV
testing).
240. See Anita Allen, Moral Multiculturalism, Childbearing, and AIDS, in HIV, AIDS AND
CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES, supra note 4, at 367, 373 (summarizing arguments of
moralists). Seventy-four percent of HIV-infected women who have children live with at least one of their
children. Mark A. Schuster, HIV-Infected Parents and Their Children in the United States, 90 AM. J. PB.
HEALTH 1074, 1076-1077 (2000). Forty-five percent of children born to HIV-infected mothers reside with a
primary caregiver who is not their biological parent. American Academy of Pediatrics, Identification and Care
of HIV-Exposed and HIV-Infected Infants, Children and Adolescents in Foster Care, 106 PEDIATRICS 149, 149
(2000).
241. Faden, supra note 202, at 14-15.
242. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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this is not a life worth living, and the argument that HIV-infected women
should not reproduce becomes even more difficult when one considers that most
children born to them will not be infected with HIV.244 Calculations regarding
possible long-term effects of treatment regimens, fetal and infant toxicity, and
relative reductions in the risk of adverse health outcomes are even less clear.
2. Respect for autonomy
The ethical principle of respect for autonomy emphasizes individual freedom
and choice, consisting of freedom from controlling interference by others and
from personal limitations that prevent meaningful choice.245 Prenatal HIV-
screening programs impact autonomy concerns in two different ways. First, HIV
screening will provide women with information that they may consider to be
highly material and perhaps even essential to making informed choices about
childbearing and medical treatment.246 For example, the mother of an HIV-
infected newborn may be horrified to discover that she could have significantly
reduced the chance of perinatal transmission to her child with antiretroviral
treatment or elective cesarean section, if only she had known of her own HIV
status prior to childbirth.247 Her "choice" not to take such precautions during
pregnancy was not autonomous in the sense of being fully informed of the risks
involved, and neither was her "choice" not to determine her HIV status prior to
or during pregnancy, to the extent she was not aware of her possible risk of
infection and available therapies to prevent perinatal transmission. HIV-
screening programs that ensure that all pregnant women are provided risk and
prevention information and have access to testing if they choose to learn their
HIV status enhance women's autonomy by providing them with information
necessary to make the best possible choices for themselves and their children.248
HIV-related counseling may be particularly important to achieving true
autonomy for women in light of the traditional HEV health care delivery system's
243. See Madison Powers, The Moral Right to Have Children, in HIV, AIDS AND CHILDBEARING:
PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES, supra note 4, at 334 (finding no clear answer to inquiry measuring harm of
being born HIV-infected against nonexistence); John D. Arras, AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having
Children in Fear and Trembling, 68 MILBANK Q. 353, 367 (1990) (concluding that risk assumed by HIV-
infected women on behalf of their children lies on the margin of social acceptability). "Taken as a whole, this is
a group of children who, in the large majority, are physically healthy or who have a chronic but relatively stable
illness that allows them to function in the community and in school." Lawrence Wissow et al., Psychosocial
Issues for Children Born to HIV-Infected Mothers, in HIV, AIDS AND CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE
LIVES, supra note 4, at 78, 79.
244. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
245. Faden, supra note 202, at 16-17.
246. See Juliet McKenna, supra note 152, at 134; see also Arras, supra note 243, at 374 (promoting
implementation ofnondirective reproductive counseling for HIV-infected women that expands their awareness
of available options).
247. This troubling scenario is often emphasized by proponents of mandatory HIV testing programs. See
Renna, supra note 152, at 407.
248. Of course, women's autonomy would be maximized in this situation if they also had access to the
care necessary to effect any of the full range of choices theoretically available to them given current medical
knowledge.
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failure to effectively identify HIV-infected women with its established risk factor
approach to screening, 249 and to offer effective I{V treatment to women on
equal terms compared to men.
250
On the other hand, mandatory prenatal and newborn testing policies
undermine women's autonomy by forcing them to undergo medical testing
without their consent, and by interfering with their customary authority to make
medical decisions on behalf of their minor children.251 HIV-screening policies
also may compromise women's autonomy by requiring or offering testing
without providing the related counseling that would enable them to understand
the full significance of the tests being performed on them or their children and,
under "voluntary" programs, make an informed decision about whether to agree
to or refuse an FIIV test. 252 Even completely voluntary newborn testing is
dubious from an autonomy perspective because it focuses public attention and
resources away from preventive prenatal interventions and provides women with
[lV information too late for them to reduce the risk of perinatal transmission.
Finally, the specter of compelled treatment that lurks behind mandatory
testing programs clearly constitutes autonomy-negating coercion. For example,
in the absence of a pregnant woman's consent and cooperation, it would be
impossible to assure adherence to the 076 regimen without detaining her for the
second and third trimesters of her pregnancy and removing her infant from her
care almost immediately after birth.253 There is no other way to guarantee that
she would take five carefully timed doses of ZDV a day, and then administer
ZDV to her infant six times a day after birth. This level of coercion will be
almost impossible to justify on ethical grounds.
3. Justice
Justice here will be treated in its comparative sense, as a principle informing
a discussion of the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens involved in
prenatal and newborn HIV-screening programs.254 Any distributive justice
inquiry into these proposals will focus on who should bear the various costs
involved in reducing the incidence of perinatally-acquired HIV infection and
249. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
251. Faden, supra note 202, at 17. Of course, newbom testing also directly impacts a mother's autonomy
by revealing her own HIV status.
252. Of course, HIV counseling itself may threaten a woman's autonomy to the extent that the
information provided so inaccurate and incomplete as to manipulate the woman's choice. Id. For example, if an
HIV-infected pregnant woman is told that her child will almost certainly be infected by HIV, that
misinformation negates her autonomy by implicitly encouraging her to choose abortion. See supra note 136.
Also, a health care provider could undermine a pregnant patient's autonomy by informing her of the benefits of
ZDV monotherapy without advising her that ZDV monotherapy, although arguably safer for the infant, is no
longer the standard of care for the woman's own health. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
253. Ronald Bayer was the first commentator to recognize this new implication of prenatal HIV
screening after publication of the ACTG 076 results. Ronald Bayer, Ethical Challenges Posed by Zidovudine
Treatment to Reduce Vertical Transmission of HIV 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1223, 1225 (1994).
254. See Faden, supra note 202, at 18.
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AIDS. For example, one author has suggested that an HIV-infected woman
should consider the extent to which she is able and willing to provide for a
255child. Under this view, perhaps only those women who can afford private
insurance will be presumed to act ethically when they choose to have a child.
However, to condition reproductive rights on wealth in this manner seems
morally unacceptable, 256 and privileges private wealth over an even distribution
of resources among all children in society, which seems just as ethically
plausible.257 A somewhat more defensible approach would be to condition
publicly-subsidized care on acceptance of treatment to reduce the risk of
perinatal transmission. In this scenario, a woman's decision to bear a child would
not be questioned, but she would be pressured to bear some of the burdens of the
state's program in order to reduce the social costs of perinatal transmission.
Conditioning health care on medical treatment choices still raises autonomy
concerns, however, as does denying treatment to an HIV-infected child because
of his mother's medical choices.
Justice concerns also come into play in evaluating the more subtle burdens
implicated in the counseling provisions of various HIV-testing proposals. For
example, under the IOM's proposal for routine prenatal HIV testing with patient
notification, it seems ethically questionable to deny women autonomy-enhancing
information during counseling in order to reduce administrative burdens on
prenatal care providers. Particularly when it was the providers' substantial failure
to offer HIV testing to most pregnant women, and not women's failure to accept
testing, that prompted the IOM to conclude that the PHS system was not
working,258 placing some of the burdens of universal prenatal testing on the
health care system seems more just than placing all of those burdens on pregnant
women, as would occur under the IOM's truncated consent proposal.
4. Balancing ethical principles
As this discussion indicates, ethical principles are likely to conflict in any
analysis of prenatal and newborn HIV-screening programs. Accordingly, the
problem arises of how to weigh and balance ethical principles in order to arrive
at a final evaluation of the various testing proposals from an ethics standpoint.
Ethicists have developed the notion of prima facie duties to address this
255. Arras, supra note 243, at 363.
256. It also raises the specter of twentieth century eugenics programs, see supra notes 85-96 and
accompanying text, which have been largely condemned as unjust policies whose lingering effects must be
carefully guarded against. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 84.
257. "[C]hildren born of middle to upper class parents of first-world nations consume approximately
20-100 times the social resources either of children born to average-income parents in third-world nations or
low-income parents in the United States." Powers, supra note 243, at 339. Like the AIDS baby requiring
disproportionately expensive medical care, these privileged children consume more than their share of social
resources if we assume equal distribution as our ethical goal. Commentators complaining about the high cost of
caring for HIV-infected children implicitly assume an unequal regime of private wealth as their baseline for
justice.
258. See supra notes 177, 189 and accompanying text.
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balancing difficulty.259 A prima facie duty is one "always to be acted upon unless
it conflicts on a particular occasion with an equal or stronger duty., 260 A prima
facie duty may be trumped when more compelling, opposing demands are
261presented by a competing moral principle. Beneficence, respect for autonomy
and justice each present a prima facie ethical duty, and this section attempts to
analyze how their competing demands may be resolved in the prenatal and
newborn HIV testing contexts.
Mandatory newborn testing appears to be morally unacceptable under ethical
principles. By the time a child has been born, it is too late to reduce the risk that
he262 will be infected with HIV, and the child poses virtually no risk of infection
263to others. An early HIV test will indicate whether he has been exposed
perinatally to HIV,26 and identify him as a candidate for early treatment that will
reduce from approximately twenty percent to four percent his chance of
developing a serious opportunistic infection in his first year of life. 26' Although
early identification may provide some benefit to the child, access to treatment is
uneven,266 so the health benefits of prophylactic treatment may not be realized
even assuming maternal consent to treatment.
At the same time, a mandatory newborn testing policy imposes significant
costs on the mother's autonomy, as her own MV status is revealed without
providing her with counseling or seeking her consent. Also significant are the
huge potential costs of compelling treatment of the child over the mother's
objection, which generally would involve removing the child from her care.267
Compelled treatment would harm the child by interfering in his relationship with
his parents268 and, secondarily, burden society by increasing the number of
children in the foster care system. Taken together, these costs outweigh the
limited benefits of early identification and treatment of HIV-exposed infants.
Admittedly, the cost-benefit ratio would be more evenly balanced if we assume
maternal consent to treatment once HIV exposure has been identified, but that
assumption would make mandatory testing even less compelling. If a mother
would consent to treatment, there is no reason to believe that she would not
259. See Faden, supra note 202, at 20.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Throughout this paper, children will be referred to with the male pronoun simply to make them
more easily distinguishable from HIV-infected women, who will, of course, be referred to with the female
pronoun.
263. The three primary routes of HIV transmission are sexual contact, needle sharing, and perinatal
transmission from mother to child. Infants do not engage in high-risk behaviors or bear other children. HIV is
not transmitted through casual contact, or even relatively intimate family contact such as diaper changing that
involves exposure to urine and feces. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 1, at 23-29.
264. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 62-63, 73-78 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 211-215 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
268. See Wissow, supra note 243, at 92 (noting benefit to child of parent's participatory role in HIV-
related medical care); see generally Ellen Wright Clayton, Screening and Treatment of Newborns, 29 Hous. L.
REv. 85 (1992) (discussing psychosocial harms to child of compelled treatment of newboms).
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consent to testing (prenatal or newborn), and the benefits of early newborn
identification then could be gained without any significant autonomy costs at all.
A mandatory prenatal testing program also does not appear to be ethically
viable, for similar reasons. It is true that from the perspective of beneficence, it is
much more compelling to determine a woman's HIV status when she is pregnant
than to determine her child's status after she has given birth. Unlike newborn
diagnosis, prenatal diagnosis, if it leads to treatment, allows an WV-infected
woman to increase significantly the odds that her child likely will be born
uninfected with HIV. However, a mandatory prenatal testing program would
impose substantial autonomy costs, particularly if it were linked to compelled
treatment: the woman would be forced to submit to medical testing without her
consent, learn that she has a fatal disease that also may have a serious impact on
her child's health, and face detention so the state could ensure that she took
potentially toxic medication five times daily during the last two trimesters of her
pregnancy. These burdens cannot be justified, even if one assumed that a
pregnant woman owes a greater moral duty of beneficence to her fetus than she
would to a born child, for whose benefit it is established that she has no duty to
undergo medical treatment.269 The autonomy costs of compelling treatment are
far too high. Furthermore, if we assume the pregnant woman's cooperation with
treatment, the lesser autonomy costs of merely mandating testing cannot be
justified as there is no reason to assume the same woman will not cooperate with
diagnosis.
A proposal such as the IOM's for routine prenatal HIV screening with patient
notification involves a more complex balancing of ethical principles. Learning
that a pregnant woman is HIV-infected may lead to a significantly improved
medical outcome for her child. It also may lead to treatment for the sake of her
own health which, given recent advances in AIDS medicine such as combination
therapy, likely will directly benefit the woman to no small degree. However,
under the IOM's proposal, health care providers would no longer be required to
provide HIV counseling, regarding either the woman's own risk or perinatal
transmission, before eliciting the woman's "consent" to testing. Her autonomy in
medical decisionmaking would be compromised as a result. Although if an HIV
test result proved positive much of the information omitted from pretest
counseling could be provided in a post-test setting, shifting even this temporal
burden to pregnant women seems unjust given that the primary reason fully
voluntary prenatal testing policies are "failing" is doctors' reluctance to invest
time in counseling their pregnant patients about a significant prenatal health
risk 27 that many women may know little about given women's historic
invisibility in the AIDS epidemic.271 Less certain autonomy costs of routine
prenatal testing-such as encouraging women to learn their HIV status without
guaranteeing access to the care required to effectuate informed medical
269. See infra note 395 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 177, 189 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 130-131, 140-142 and accompanying text.
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decisions, the risk that routine testing will lead to a system of effective
mandatory testing, and the threat of compelled care-only make this program
more ethically suspect.
V. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING PROPOSED HIV-
SCREENING PROGRAMS FOR PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS
Law provides the final framework for analyzing proposed prenatal and
newborn HIV-screening programs. Legal frameworks for analyzing the
permissibility of burdening individual liberties in order to advance the state's
interest in promoting public health are attractive because they may be used to tie
the medical perspective captured in the public health model together with ethical
concerns for personal autonomy and the just distribution of public health
programs' costs. However, although the law can provide insight into how some
of the conflicts inherent in proposed HIV-screening programs may be most
appropriately resolved, it does not contribute perfectly clear answers to the
debate over these programs. Most fundamentally, the courts have not addressed
for some time the constitutional limits of public health programs, and it is not
apparent how they will balance the state's interest in promoting public health
against individual rights. Only after this threshold issue is addressed, it is
possible to analyze whether prenatal and newborn HJV-screening programs are
consistent with constitutional protections found in the Due Process Clause and
the Fourth Amendment.
A. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO PUBLIC HEALTH
PROGRAMS
The states, by virtue of their police power, have the authority to enact and
enforce laws and regulations designed to promote the public health and safety.
272
Under the broadest possible understanding of the police power, states may take
"any steps necessary to ensure the public health and welfare, to foster prosperity,
and to maintain public order." 273 While courts generally have not construed the
police power as authorizing any steps necessary to effect proper state goals, they
have upheld various governmental restrictions on individual liberty when those
restrictions are required to protect public health.274
272. Malloy, supra note 152, at 1195; Post, supra note 152, at 199. The police power is reserved to the
states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Malloy, supra note 152, at 1193.
273. Malloy, supra note 152, at 1193.
274. Sangree, supra note 85, at 381.
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1. The early cases
The leading case discussing the role of the courts in reviewing public health
measures is Jacobson v. Massachusetts,275 decided by the Supreme Court in
1905. The petitioner in Jacobson challenged a local ordinance that ordered all
residents of Cambridge to be vaccinated for smallpox.276 The Court recognized
that police power legislation must yield to federal constitutional and statutory
law, but also noted that the "possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to
such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the
country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the
community.' '277 The Court refused to review the legislature's determination, in
the face of medical controversy, that vaccination prevented the spread of
smallpox, and found that the ordinance was reasonably related to the state's
interest in reducing the incidence of communicable disease and therefore was
constitutional.278
Courts reviewing constitutional challenges to public health regulations after
Jacobson generally have upheld them, to the effect that, "[t]raditionally, the
police power to legislate measures to control contagious disease epidemics was
practically boundless in its ability to impose quarantine and mandatory treatment
on persons with infectious diseases. 2 79 Judges usually have given great
deference to the factual conclusions underlying exercises of the police power,
and have subjected public health laws to minimal scrutiny, requiring only a
reasonable relationship between the stated public health goal and restrictions
imposed on individual liberties.280 Under this standard of review, personal
intrusions ranging from the relatively inoffensive, such as municipal water
281fluoridation, to the extreme, including indefinite confinement of individuals
infected with or exposed to a communicable disease,282 have been found
constitutional. And although public health measures are only justified to the
283extent that the targeted behaviors injure other people, quarantines have been
upheld even in situations where isolation was not necessarily required to protect
the public, most typically in cases of venereal disease where behavior
275. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
276. Id. at 12-14.
277. Id. at 26 (internal quotations omitted).
278. Id. at 30-31. "It is no part of the function of a court or a jury to determine which one of two modes
[of public health response to the smallpox outbreak] was likely to be the most effective for the protection of the
public against disease. That was for the legislative department to determine in light of all the information it had
or could obtain." Id. at 30.
279. Sangree, supra note 85, at 381-82.
280. Post, supra note 152, at 200.
281. See Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
282. See, e.g., Kirk v. Bd. of Health, 65 S.E. 387, 390 (S.C. 1909) (approving permanent quarantine of
woman with "slightly contagious" form of leprosy); Crayton v. Larabee, 116 N.E. 355, 358 (N.Y. 1917)
(upholding two week quarantine of healthy woman living next door to house of smallpox patient); People v.
Barmore, 134 N.E. 815 (111. 1922), reh 'g denied, (unreported) (approving indefinite confinement of typhoid
carrier); see generally Deborah Jones Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling
AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 739, 776-77 (1986).
283. Sangree, supra note 85, at 381.
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modifications such as avoiding unsafe sex practices could have been an effective
means of preventing infections not spread by casual contact.
284
2. Applying the traditional public health law model to prenatal and newborn
HIV screening
If a court were to apply the Jacobson reasoning to prenatal and newborn
HIV screening, the state would need to justify only minimally any resulting
restrictions on the liberty of HIV-infected pregnant women and new mothers. It
is very likely that mandatory prenatal HIV screening, even if coupled with
compelled adherence to therapies shown to reduce the risk of perinatal
transmission, would be deemed a valid exercise of the state's police powers
under this standard of review. The state's interest in preventing the spread of
communicable disease is unquestionably a proper purpose of police power
legislation.285  The legislature's determination that ZDV monotherapy is
preferable to antiretroviral combination therapy as a prevention method, or vice
versa, would be granted deference by the court, as would the state's
determination whether pregnant women should be compelled to undergo
antiretroviral therapy, elective cesarean section, or both.286 The fact that this
public health policy would sacrifice pregnant women's liberty to public health
goals would not render the public policy unconstitutional, for such rights would
be viewed as properly limited by the health needs of the community, and no less
permissible than the confinement and compelled treatment of other carriers of
communicable disease.287
A mandatory newborn HIV-screening program would be much more
difficult for the state to justify under public health law doctrine. Newborn
screening, even when accompanied by compelled treatment, does nothing to
prevent the spread of HIV infection and resulting harm to third persons. As
previously discussed, newborns themselves, once infected, pose virtually no risk
284. See Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1943) (affirming order confining woman with gonorrhea
to venereal disease camp despite evidence that she did not engage in activities risking transmission); In re
McGee, 184 P. 14 (Cal. 1919) (rejecting claim that state had to treat venereal disease patients at home rather
than in quarantine camps). The practice of detaining individuals suffering from venereal disease was
widespread. For example, during World War I, more than 30,000 prostitutes were incarcerated in federally-
supported institutions with the aim of reducing the incidence of syphilis. Court challenges to this practice were
rejected. Sangree, supra note 85, at 385.
285. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27 (1905). The Supreme Court has held that "[ulpon the principle of self-
defense, of paramount necessity, a community has a right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which
threatens the safety of its members." Id.
286. Cf supra notes 278-283 and accompanying text (discussing traditional judicial deference to factual
determinations by public health officials on matters of disease control).
287. Perversely, a policy of mandatory prenatal HIV screening may be more vulnerable to attack under
traditional public health law doctrine if the state did not also require HIV-infected women identified by the
program to undergo treatment in order to reduce the risk ofperinatal transmission, Since testing alone does not
reduce the risk to others of infection, a court could well find that mere testing is not reasonably related to
protecting the public health. However, under precedents such as those allowing complete isolation of
individuals infected with diseases communicable only through intimate contact, see supra note 284 and
accompanying text, a court could apply the reasonable relationship test very loosely and find that mandating
testing alone is a permissible exercise of the state's police powers.
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of infection to others. 288 The state's police powers generally do not extend to
compelling treatment when failure to treat would harm only the patient.289 The
only arguable public harm resulting from failure to intervene as early as possible
in the medical treatment of HIV-exposed children is the economic cost of caring
for children with rapid disease progression. However, the courts have never
relied on economic harm as a rationale for public health regulation, and even if
they did it is unclear whether prolonging the life of a chronically ill child is less
expensive than his or her early death. Accordingly, even under the highly
permissive public health law doctrine of the early twentieth century, newborn
HIV testing is unlikely to be found a valid exercise of the state's police power.
290
3. Rethinking public health law
Although the Supreme Court revisited the constitutional boundaries of state
public health regulation set forth in Jacobson,29 1 many scholars have pointed out
that Jacobson has not aged well in the face of the Supreme Court's expansion of
constitutionally protected individual rights and scientific advances permitting
292more focused disease control measures. Recent lower court decisions evince
293decreasing judicial deference to the conclusions of public health regulators.
Therefore, even assuming that mandatory prenatal HIV testing and, more
questionably, mandatory newborn HIV testing would be found constitutional
under traditional public health law doctrine, it is very likely that a modem court
would apply a more stringent standard of review.
Even the more conservative critics of traditional public health doctrine agree
that courts should not accept state public health determinations at face value, and
should themselves evaluate the relevant medical evidence to determine whether
it justifies challenged restraints on individual liberty.294 This shift in approach is
motivated by two related considerations. The first-aimed at eliminating
situations such as that presented here where mandatory prenatal testing does not
clearly meet public health criteria yet easily passes constitutional muster despite
its burdens on individual liberty-is the relatively uncontroversial premise that
the law should only tolerate the burdens public health measures place on
individual liberties when those measures are medically justifiable. 295 Secondly,
courts also have been concerned that the state may pass impermissibly motivated
288. See supra note 263.
289. See Sangree, supra note 85, at 381.
290. The state's parens patriae power to protect the child's health is discussed in notes 355-369 and
accompanying text, infra.
291. The Supreme Court last addressed the constitutional validity of public health laws implemented
under the police power in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922), a case upholding an ordinance conditioning
enrollment in school on compliance with vaccination requirements. See generally Scott Burris, Fear Itself"
AIDS, Herpes and Public Health Decisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 479,489-90 (1985).
292. See, e.g., Post, supra note 152, at 200; Sangree, supra note 85, at 394; Note, The Constitutional
Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1274, 1276-79 (1986).
293. See, e.g., New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
294. See Burns, supra note 291, at 493.
295. Id. at481.
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regulations and then evade constitutional review by hiding behind judicial
deference to its exercise of the police power.296 Courts can only determine
whether a regulation is medically necessary and justified by the legitimate state
interest in protecting the public health if they look at the underlying medical
evidence offered to support the regulation.
297
Critics of the traditional deference afforded public health regulations
generally also agree that intervening case law on constitutionally recognized
individual liberties dictates that, where fundamental rights are compromised, the
state must show both a compelling interest and that the regulation represents the
least restrictive means of achieving that interest.298 Scholars differ in their
understanding of how government and private interests should be balanced when
public health is at stake, however. Some commentators assume that the law
should remain particularly deferential to public health regulation, after assuring
that the medical evidence supports the state's intervention. In practice, this view
is represented in proposed legal frameworks that essentially allow public health
concerns to trump individual liberties by construing "least intrusive means" to
mean the least intrusive means for obtaining the best public health outcome.299
According to these authors, individual rights, no matter how compelling, must
submit to restrictive public health measures even if another public health
response would be less restrictive, less costly or less controversial, so long as the
alternate response is even slightly less effective.3 °0
Other scholars believe that the state's interest in promoting the public health
should be treated no differently than other state interests, and should be weighed
against, and not automatically trump, conflicting individual liberties.301 This
view is the most persuasive. In modem cases, the courts have frequently placed
constitutional limits on state action under the police power, such as law
enforcement action to protect the public safety, even when the alternatives
available were less effective at achieving the state's admittedly compelling
objective.30 2 Although the early cases broadly interpreting the police power in
the public health context have not been revisited or overruled by the Supreme
296. See New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, 612 F.2d at 648-49.
297. See id. (rejecting argument that court defer to school board's determination regarding risk of
hepatitis B transmission in classroom). "To permit the factual determinations of these [government] agencies to
go unchallenged may be to neglect [the court's task to ensure that constitutional and statutory standards are
followed by these agencies], for the facts will often be dispositive, and the question of compliance with
prevailing legal standards will often be determined by the manner in which the agency has found these facts."
Id. at 648.
298. Sangree, supra note 85, at 394; Burris, supra note 291, at 481; see also Note, supra note 292, at
1292 (asserting modem medical knowledge makes it realistic for courts to require very close fit between public
health means and ends). Courts have begun to demand a showing of least restrictive means, as well. City of
New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 505 N.Y.S.2d 1015
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (closing gay bathhouses permissible restriction on freedom of association because least
restrictive means to protect public health).
299. Burris, supra note 291, at 483.
300. Id.
301. See Note, supra note 292, at 1280-81.
302. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (creating exclusionary rule as remedy for
unconstitutional search and seizure).
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Court, there does not seem to be any justification for the assertion that the state's
interest in public health is more compelling than its interest in public safety, or
that the individual liberties of criminal suspects are entitled to more protection
than those of the general citizenry. Under this view, modem cases limiting the
weight given the police power when individual liberties are at stake indirectly
overrule the early public health police power cases. Outdated precedent that has
not been revisited since the Warren Court's expansion of constitutionally
protected individual rights does not provide a convincing basis for treating the
protection of public health differently than other state interests arising under the
police power. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper will focus on applying
modem constitutional frameworks to prenatal and newborn HJV-testing policies,
without assuming that the public health rationales for these policies are entitled
to any greater deference than other state interests.
B. MODERN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. '303 The Due Process Clause affords certain substantive rights to individuals
in addition to procedural rights and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
as "barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them. ' '304 One of the liberty interests substantively
protected by the Due Process Clause is a zone of privacy that arguably would be
invaded under current proposals for prenatal and newborn HIV-screening
programs. The Court has identified two distinct strands of this privacy interest-
confidentiality and autonomy° 5-both of which are implicated by HIV-
screening programs and each of which will be discussed in turn.
1. Informational privacy
The Court has characterized the confidentiality strand of privacy as
encompassing the individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. 306 The leading case on the constitutional right to confidentiality is
Whalen v. Roe.30 7 In Whalen, physicians and patients challenged a New York
statute that required health care providers to report all prescriptions for certain
highly abused drugs to the state department of health so that overuse by
individual patients could be monitored and investigated. The State maintained
the collected information in a vault and reviewed it on computers whose data
303. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Individuals have the same protection against the Federal Government
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, which contains similar language. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
304. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
305. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977).
306. Id. at 599.
307. Id.
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could be retrieved only inside a designated reading room to which access was
strictly limited. The patient plaintiffs alleged that being forced to disclose
sensitive medical information to the State violated their right to confidentiality
and exposed them to potential stigma as drug users should any of the collected
information be leaked or improperly accessed. The Court recognized the
patients' constitutional interest in nondisclosure but, after balancing the
individuals' privacy concerns against the State's interest in detecting abuse of
addictive prescription drugs, found the New York statute constitutional. In
weighing the individual interests at stake as slight, the Court emphasized that the
infringement of confidentiality rights under the statute was particularly limited
due to the very small number of State regulators with access to the collected
information, noting that broader disclosure was highly unlikely given the
security measures employed by the State to protect the personal data.
Subsequent cases have further clarified how courts are to balance the
competing interests at stake in confidentiality disputes. In general, the purpose of
the challenged statute and the public interest it serves must be weighed against
the scope and extent of its intrusion on individual privacy.30 8 Lower courts have
interpreted this balancing test as imposing a burden on the State to justify an
invasion of informational privacy; that burden increases as the sensitivity of the
information disclosed and the severity of the intrusion likewise increase. 30 9 The
state regulation authorizing the invasion need not be perfectly tailored, however,
as legislation that has some effect on individual liberty or privacy will not be
held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in
part.
3 10
As no state intrusion to informational privacy occurs when a woman
consents to FHV testing for herself or her child, only mandatory testing programs
implicate constitutional confidentiality interests and will be discussed in this
Section. A woman's interest in avoiding unwanted disclosure of her IV status
is implicated by both prenatal and newborn mandatory HIV-screening
proposals. 311 The intrusion at stake in these contexts is unusually severe because,
unlike most confidentiality cases where the state is collecting and/or releasing
information that has been independently produced or assembled, the state here is
compelling the woman to generate very personal information that previously did
not exist at all. In the woman's own hands, this state-created information will
308. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977).
309. See, e.g.,Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Thome v. City
of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984).
310. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597.
311. A woman's HIV status is revealed both by prenatal and, if she is infected, newborn HIV testing. See
supra notes 53-58. For purposes of this discussion, the confidentiality interest at stake encompasses both the
generation of medical records containing the woman's HIV status and the subsequent reporting of positive
results to health care providers who receive and inform the woman of her test results, and to public health
officials under HIV/AIDS case reporting laws. State reporting requirements are not the primary target of
objections to prenatal and newborn HIV-screening programs and will not be discussed here in the context of
voluntary HIV testing. State reporting requirements do increase the intrusiveness of mandatory HIV screening,
however, as they generally are automatically triggered by a positive test result.
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likely have a profound effect on her self-perception, transforming her
expectations of how long she will live and what her quality of life will be, which
in turn may affect her decisionmaking on such intimate matters as marriage,
sexual relationships, and childbearing. In the hands of her health care providers,
information that a woman is HIV-infected may lead to loss of control over her
312own medical decisions and loss of medical services for herself and her
children.3 13 If disclosed to her sexual partner,314 either by virtue of state partner
notification laws 315 or "voluntarily" after knowledge of the woman's HIV status
was forced upon her by the state, it may lead to domestic violence316 and the
dissolution of her family/sexual relationships. 317 Finally, in light of documented
discrimination against individuals infected with HIV, information that a woman
is HIV-infected, if disseminated more broadly, may jeopardize her housing and
employment.318
In the case of newborn HIV testing, a persuasive argument can be made that
the newborn, as a separate individual, has a right to obtain all information
relevant to providing him with the best health care possible, regardless of
whether that information indirectly reveals information about either parent's
health status. Accordingly, although the mother's HIV status is revealed when
her newborn is tested for the virus, her confidentiality interest in that information
312. See Field, supra note 147, at 414-16 (discussing potential for pressure to abort or compelled
preventive treatment if a pregnant woman tests positive for HIV). In this respect the confidentiality strand and
the autonomy strand, discussed in Part V.B.2, of privacy are very closely related.
313. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of Court and
Human Rights Decisions, Part II: Discrimination, 263 JAMA 2086 (1990) (discussing discrimination
experienced by people with AIDS, including discrimination by health care workers). A 1989 survey of health
care providers specializing in neonatal care indicated that providers are significantly less likely to recommend
aggressive treatment for non-HIV-related medical problems if they know a child is HIV-exposed.
Recommendations for treatment of children born to HIV-infected mothers were similar to recommendations
made for children with Down's Syndrome (a chromosomal abnormality causing mental retardation) and cystic
fibrosis (a chronic, debilitating condition often causing death in adolescence). If a child was known to be HIV-
infected and not just HIV-exposed, recommendations for treatment were similar to those made for children with
Tay-Sachs disease, a severe neurological condition that causes death within the first two years of life. Betty
Wolder Levin et al., Treatment Choices for Infants in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at Risk for AIDS, 265
JAMA 2976, 2979 (1991).
314. It is possible to argue that an infected woman's sexual partner has an independent interest in
obtaining knowledge of her HIV status, due to the risk that sexual activity with an infected partner poses to
one's own health. However, the state has not chosen to mandate HIV testing of all adults for the purpose of
disclosing potential transmission risks to sexual partners and others at risk of infection. The state therefore
should not be permitted to "load" its argument for prenatal testing by relying on infection risks posed to third-
party adults. The reason pregnant women are singled out for testing is the risk they pose to their prospective
children, and the state's testing policy should be required to stand or fall on that basis.
315. The Ryan White CARE Act requires states to make good faith efforts to notify the spouse of an
HIV-infected person that he or she may have been exposed to HIV and should be tested. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-
27a (West 1991 & Supp. 2000). Certain states mandate contact tracing and the notification of all partners the
infected individual may have exposed to HIV. STEIN, supra note 33, at 94.
316. The National Association of People with AIDS has documented a strong link between domestic
violence and HIV infection. In a national survey of HWV-infected women, seventeen percent of all women and
twenty-five percent of Hispanic women reported violence in the home. Richard L. North & Karen H.
Rothenberg, Partner Notification and the Threat of Domestic iolence Against Women with HIV Infection, 329
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1194, 1195 (1993).
317. Wissow et al., supra note 243, at 84-85.
318. See generally Gostin, supra note 313.
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should be at least somewhat discounted in the context of newborn testing.
Several hurdles remain, however, before the state will be able to justify even the
newborn intrusion on informational privacy grounds.
First, it is inappropriate to ignore entirely the intrusion to the mother's
confidentiality that results from newborn testing. Even though virologic HV-
testing technology has improved significantly since newborn testing was first
proposed, newborn screening programs rely on antibody tests such as ELISA to
initially identify those infants who are born to HIV-infected mothers and thus are
candidates for more specific testing.319 As a result, newborn screening programs
in practice identify many more HIV-infected women than are necessary to
identify all children who are HV-infected. 320 Furthermore, even accepting the
abstract concept of a child's independent right to obtain all relevant medical
information by waiving his confidentiality interest and submitting to testing, it is
less than clear who can exercise that right on behalf of the child while he is a
legally incompetent minor.321 Traditionally, the child's parents have the
recognized legal authority to make such decisions on behalf of the child3 22 so,
even allowing for the existence of an independent right in the child, the state still
may not be free to disregard any objections the mother may have to newborn
HIV testing.3
23
Irrespective of who is allowed to stand in the child's shoes for purposes of
asserting his confidentiality interest in HIV-related medical information, the
child has a number of interests that weigh against testing, many of which parallel
his mother's interests in this regard. For example, mandatory newborn testing is
highly intrusive, compelling not only the release of otherwise existing medical
records generated in the course of routine newborn care, but also the creation of
highly sensitive medical data. Discovery of that information may undermine the
newborn's relationship with his primary caregiver, as identifying a child as ill in
the newborn period has been shown to disrupt the developing parent-child
relationship, often with significant long-term psychological consequences for the
324
child. Bonds between parent and child may be further weakened if the state
compels particular medical treatment for HIV-exposed children, displacing the
319. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
320. To the extent medical experts recommend specific treatments for HIV-exposed infants that are most
effective before an infant's own HIV status can be confirmed, however, knowledge of perinatal HIV exposure
alone may be deemed relevant to the child's health care, conceived of in preventive terms. See supra notes 72-
78 and accompanying text.
321. The confidentiality cases generally have not dealt with information concerning minors. The
potential conflict between the parent's right to make decisions for her child and the state's interest in the child's
well-being have been addressed most frequently in the medical decisionmaking context, discussed extensively
in Part V.B.2.b. That analysis will not be repeated here, where it is sufficient to point out that the mother may
well have the right to make the decision whether to waive confidentiality on behalf of her child.
322. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
323. Since the parent's role as family decisionmaker is to promote the interests of the family and not
merely the interest of any individual member, it is entirely appropriate for a parent to take the needs of other
family members into consideration when making decisions on an individual child's behalf. See Ferdinand
Schoeman, Parental Discretion and Children s Rights: Background and Implications for Medical Decision-
Making, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 45, 48-49 (1985).
324. Clayton, supra note 268, at 106.
[Vol. 13: 195
Testing Pregnant Women and Newborns for HIV
parent from their primary caregiver role.325 The child also will be vulnerable to
discrimination in medical treatment if he is shown to be HIV-exposed 326 and, if
his HIV status becomes known outside of the health care setting, that
information will pose a risk both to his housing and the economic support he
receives from his parents.
Although under mandatory testing regimes the state appears only to compel
the creation of individual HIV status information and its disclosure to health care
providers and public health officials, the state interest served by prenatal and
newborn HIV testing cannot simply beHIV testing and disclosure.3 27 Forcing an
individual to confront her own health information for no purpose other than the
confrontation itself would not outweigh the individual's liberty interest in
informational privacy. The larger state purposes motivating prenatal HIV-
screening programs presumably are preventing perinatal transmission and
enabling immediate, improved medical care for pregnant women and
newborns. 328 Likewise, the state interests asserted to justify newborn HIV
screening include early medical intervention to improve health outcomes for
HIV-infected infants.
As this Article has repeatedly emphasized, these state purposes cannot be
fulfilled without assuring access to care and otherwise ensuring treatment for all
HIV-infected pregnant women and HIV-exposed newborns identified by the
mandatory testing programs, for example by compelling treatment. 32 9 None of
the current proposals for mandatory prenatal or newborn HLV-testing programs
includes a guarantee of access to care or even addresses the issue of how or
whether treatment is expected to result when a woman or newborn tests positive
for HIV. The state interest at stake in the screening programs therefore must be
significantly discounted as the purpose of these programs is unlikely to be
achieved even if invasion of the woman's and/or child's privacy were allowed.
Furthermore, as Whalen makes clear, the likelihood that the state program
will result in the disclosure of confidential information to individuals other than
the state regulators designated to receive it must be considered when weighing
the interests at stake. As an initial matter, prenatal and newborn IfV-testing
programs not only fail to protect against disclosure to all third parties but in
operation require disclosure to health care providers who would not otherwise
know the patient's HIV status. By operation of state and federal law, the
325. Cf. Dumois, supra note 151, at 155 (noting that mother is essential to successful treatment of child
and noting potential harm to child if mother's cooperation not elicited).
326. See supra note 313.
327. Kevin J. Cumin, Newborn HIV Screening and New York Assembly Bill No. 6747-B: Privacy and
Equal Protection of Pregnant Women, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 875 (1994) (discussing the state interests
reflected in New York's AIDS Baby Bill).
328. The state also may assert an interest in obtaining the woman's HIV status in order to reduce the risk
of infection to adult third parties. Several reasons why such an interest must be rejected as a justification for
mandatory prenatal testing are discussed in supra notes 239 and 315.
329. As has been stated previously, it is inappropriate and illogical to assume consent to treatment in a
public health regime that explicitly assumes that women will not consent to HIV testing for themselves and for
their children. See Section IV.B.4.
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information also may be disclosed to spouses and other sexual and needle
sharing partners. 330 Beyond these intended disclosures, unintended disclosure
also is a substantial likelihood. Unlike the medical information at issue in
Whalen, in a modem health care setting HIV-related patient information is not
kept locked in a vault, but instead is in a patient's medical file that can be
accessed by a significant number of hospital personnel both on paper and via
computer.331 Through the operation of public and private insurance, HIV-related
information also may be revealed to Medicaid, private insurers and, through the
latter, possibly private employers.
332
In light of these significant problems with maintaining confidentiality for
mandated HIV test results, the minimal state interests served by testing, and the
severity of the intrusion imposed on an individual's informational privacy,
mandatory prenatal and newbom HIV-testing programs cannot be justified and
therefore violate the individual's constitutionally protected confidentiality right.
Of course, the outcome of this balancing test could change significantly if the
state were able to compel treatment for HIV-infected individuals identified
through mandatory screening.333 In that situation, the weight of the state
objectives achieved under testing programs would increase dramatically,
whereas the intrusiveness to the individual would increase only incrementally.
334
However, it is unclear whether the state has authority to compel treatment in this
situation, and as a result to bolster its interest in obtaining HIV status
information. That question touches on the autonomy strand of privacy rights
protected under the Due Process Clause, and is discussed in the following
Section.
2. Privacy as autonomy
The autonomy strand of the Due Process concept of privacy encompasses the
individual's liberty interest in "independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions., 335 One kind of important decision included in the
autonomy aspect of the Due Process Clause involves bodily integrity, or the
330. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
331. Poor women who receive care in public health care settings, like most HIV-infected women and
children do, particularly lack control over how their confidentiality is respected in health care institutions, and
may have to exchange their medical privacy for public social services. Berger et al., supra note 131, at 79.
332. Madison Powers, Legal Protections of Confidential Medical Information and the Need for
Antidiscrimination Laws, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION: TOWARDS A MORALLY ACCEPTABLE
PUBLIC POLICY FOR HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS, supra note 54, at 221, 237-38.
333. In order to realize the state objectives justifying HIV-screening programs, it will be necessary to
have a system in which access to care is guaranteed, and HIV-infected pregnant women and newboms are
compelled to undergo treatment. See supra notes 326-29 and accompanying text. A model of compelled care
assumes access to treatment.
334. The risk of increased medical coercion already exists under mandatory testing regimes as women
and children found to be infected presumably would be subject to extremely strong pressure to accede to the
treatment recommendations of their physicians. A policy or practice of compelling treatment in this situation
would only increase the certainty of coercion.
335. Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, 599-60 (1977).
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"right to determine what shall be done with [one's] own body."336 A competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment337 that is compromised under mandatory prenatal or newborn
HIV-testing programs. The right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute,
however, and "whether [an individual's] constitutional rights have been violated
must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state
interests. 338
a. The nonpregnant adult's right to refuse medical treatment
Although this issue is not directly implicated by prenatal or newborn HIV-
testing programs, the right of a competent adult who is not pregnant to refuse
medical treatment is an important baseline from which to discuss possible limits
on the state's ability to compel treatment for pregnant women and newborns.
The competent adult generally has the right to decline to have any medical
treatment initiated or continued. 339 This right is of constitutional dimension, and
extends to the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment340 and even to the right
of prisoners to refuse the administration of unwanted antipsychotic drugs. 341 The
right to refuse medical treatment and the related common law right of informed
consent also extend to the right to refuse diagnostic testing.
34 2
The individual's right to refuse medical treatment is not unchecked, however.
The state has four commonly recognized countervailing interests that may
outweigh or otherwise limit the individual's right to refuse medical treatment:
preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical
profession, and protecting innocent third parties.34 3 Only the first and fourth state
interests are implicated to any significant degree in the HIV-screening context,
and even those will not always justify compelling a nonpregnant adult to
undergo medical treatment. For example, when death likely will result from an
individual's refusal to accept medical treatment, the Supreme Court has held that
the state can impose heightened evidentiary requirements on third parties
seeking to assert an incompetent's right to refuse medical treatment. 344 At the
same time, however, the Court has reaffirmed the competent adult's right to
refuse life-preserving medical treatment,345 indicating that the state's interest in
preserving life does not trump individual autonomy so long as the individual's
wishes regarding treatment can be determined to a sufficient degree of certainty.
336. Schloendorffv. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y 1914) (J. Cardozo).
337. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
338. Id. at 279.
339. Id.; In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987).
340. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
341. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
342. Sternlight, supra note 152, at 378. But see supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing
doctrine of presumed consent for certain blood tests).
343. See, e.g., Farrell, 529 A.2d at 348-49; Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 536 N.YS.2d 492 (N.Y App. Div.
1989), aff'd, 551 N.E.2d 77 (1990).
344. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
345. See id. at 279.
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When the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties has been at
stake, however, a number of lower courts have found that the state can impose
medical treatment on an unconsenting adult in order to maintain parental support
for that adult's minor children.3 46 These cases generally have focused on the
abandonment of minor children as a result of the death of the parent, and place
the burden on the state to prove that a surviving parent or extended family
member would not properly assume responsibility for the children.347 Given this
emphasis, it is unlikely that a court would order a parent to accept unwanted
medical treatment for a noncontagious condition that was not life-threatening,
and where failure to receive treatment would not result in abandonment. An
ultimately fatal condition such as HIV infection falls in an uncertain intermediate
area, where unwanted medical treatment can prolong life and thus support for
the minor child but cannot cure a condition that sooner or later will result in
death. It is unclear how a court would treat this situation. The issue of how far
the state can go to protect innocent third parties is further complicated in the case
of a communicable disease such as HIV, because generally the state can order
medical treatment to protect a class of third parties much broader than the
infected person's dependent children-namely, society at large-even when the
treatment is for a condition that is not immediately life-threatening, so long as
treatment will prevent the transmission of disease.
348
b. Newborn HIV testing and medical treatment of children over a parent's objection
Although children arguably have a right to refuse medical testing and
treatment just as adults do, their legal incompetency makes that right largely
hypothetical. As the law does not recognize a minor child's ability to make his
own informed and voluntary decisions regarding medical treatment, and a
newborn certainly does not have the ability to express any preference on the
matter at all, a newborn's "right" to refuse medical treatment must be exercised
for him, if at all, by a surrogate decisionmaker.
349
Under the common law, the parents of a child are presumed to fill the role of
surrogate decisionmaker and have the right to consent to or refuse medical
346. See, e.g., Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (ordering blood transfusion to save life of Jehovah's Witness with seven
month old child); In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (11. 1965) (reversing lower court order compelling
medical treatment while emphasizing fact that patient had no minor children); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819
(Fla. 1993) (recognizing right to compel medical treatment to avoid abandonment of minor children).
347. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 828 (reversing order compelling blood transfusion on grounds that state
presented no evidence that noncustodial father or other relatives would not provide for children and citing
similar cases). But see President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1010 (ordering blood
transfusion to save life of mother of seven-month old infant though father was living and prepared to care for
child).
348. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (ordering smallpox vaccination to protect
community from infection). Of course, there is no medical treatment to prevent transmission, with the
exception of the preventive prenatal therapies discussed in Part L.B supra.
349. Cf. Cruzan, 479 U.S. at 280 (discussing similar limitations on an adult incompetent's ability to
exercise her right to refuse medical treatment).
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treatment on his behalf.350 Furthermore, parents in this situation are not only
exercising their child's autonomy rights, but also possess an independent interest
in parental autonomy that operates to shield family privacy from coercive state
intervention.351 Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
352establishing a home and rearing children, and are presumed under the law to
be acting in the best interests of their child when they make decisions on his
behalf.353 The deference given to parental authority is justified not only by a
parent's individual freedom to structure her home life and raise her child as she
sees fit, but also by the child's biological and psychological need for
unthreatened and unbroken continuity of care by his parents. 354 The parent
provides intimate, individualized care for the child and fills a valued socializing
role in a manner that the state cannot replicate.355
However, the state, as parens patriae, also has an interest in the well-being
of the child and may limit parental authority when necessary to protect a child's
general welfare. The state's parens patriae power is in an important sense
greater than the police power relied on to justify limitations on individual
autonomy for the sake of public health and public safety, because under its
parens patriae authority the state can act directly to protect the welfare of the
child and its interventions are not limited to preventing harm to third parties.
356
When parental autonomy and the state's interest in the child conflict, the
constitutionality of the state's intervention in the family is measured using the
same balancing test applied when other Due Process Clause liberty interests are
at stake. In this context, a court specifically must weigh the parent's liberty
interest in the care, custody and management of her child against the state's
interests in protecting the best interests of the child when the parent fails to do
so.
3 57 As parental autonomy does not extend to exposing children to illness and
358death, courts often have allowed the state to compel medical treatment for a
child over his parent's objection.359 When necessary to preserve the life of the
child, courts almost without exception have ordered medical treatment for the
child and disregarded parental objections even when grounded in the family's
religious beliefs. 360 In non-emergency health care situations, the courts have
350. Sternlight, supra note 152, at 379; Robert Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care
Decisionmaking Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L REV. 285,286-87 (1976).
351. Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy,
86 YALE L.J. 645,648 (1977).
352. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925).
353. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
354. Goldstein, supra note 351, at 649.
355. Cf Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (criticizing Platonic ideal of homogenized childrearing by the state).
356. See Madison, supra note 5, at 377. This is so because parens patriae encompasses "the right and
duty of the state to exercise its power to protect those unable to protect themselves." Richard L. Manner, Court-
Ordered Surgery for the Protection of a Viable Fetus, 5 W NEW ENG. L. REv. 125, 128 (1982).
357. Cf supra note 338 and accompanying text (outlining balancing test when adult's right to bodily
integrity at stake).
358. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
359. See generally 42 AM. JUR. 2d lnfants § 25.
360. See Manner, supra note 356, at 133.
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been more uneven in their resolution of the parent/state conflict, and generally
have focused on the reasonableness of the parent's refusal to consent to medical
treatment recommended for her child, evaluated in light of the nature of the
proposed intervention and its efficacy in temporarily or permanently resolving
the child's medical problem.
361
The state's ability to compel medical treatment in the context of newborn
WV-screening programs, therefore, will in the first instance turn on whether
HIV screening and subsequent preventive treatment for HiV-exposed newborns
is appropriately characterized as involving a life-or-death risk to the child.
Clearly, a parent's refusal to consent to H1V screening for her child is not life-
threatening in the manner that typically has triggered judicial rubber-stamping of
a state's determination that medical treatment is in the best interest of the child.
When HIV testing occurs shortly after birth, the child is not known to have a
life-threatening illness and is not even suspected of having one. All children are
tested indiscriminately, so the test cannot be justified by any diagnostic purposes
it may serve when ordered in a particular case to identify or exclude a potential
cause of physical symptoms that untreated may pose a risk to the child's life.
Under a newborn testing regime, HIV testing is not indicated to preserve the
health of any particular child, so no threat to a particular child's life can be
shown to result from his parent's refusal to allow testing.
As there is no colorable claim that a child's life is at stake, in order to compel
testing the state must show that parental refusal to allow testing is unreasonable.
Given the incidence and typical progression of pediatric HIV infection, although
some may question a parent's decision to refuse W1V testing for her child, it will
be difficult for the state to show that this refusal is unreasonable. The vast
majority of children born in the United States have no perinatal exposure to
HIV.3 62 Approximately seventy percent of children born to HIV-infected mothers
will not be infected with the virus, even if their mothers receive no antiretroviral
prenatal care to prevent perinatal transmission of lHIV.3 63 Finally, even among
HIV-infected newborns, only thirty percent will suffer from rapid disease
progression and thus benefit to any significant degree from early identification
through newborn testing.36 Overall, the risk to a child who is not tested for HIV
is slight, whereas the parent may have particular knowledge about her situation
that would make her decision to avoid such testing reasonable, even if the child
were in fact infected. For example, she may know that she and her children are
likely to face domestic violence should the child be diagnosed with HIV, that her
family is particularly vulnerable to discrimination and loss of economic stability,
361. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical Treatment
Over Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life Is Not Immediately Endangered, 21 A.L.R. 5th 248
(2000); see also Manner, supra note 356, at 133-34 (discussing cases where courts upheld parent's refusal of
medical treatment for child).
362. Seventeen per 10,000 women giving birth are infected with HIV. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra
note 4, at 39.
363. See supra note 155.
364. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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or that the family does not have the resources or insurance to pay for treatment
even if it is indicated by test results. Whatever her reasons for refusing to allow
HLV testing of her child, given the statistically slight benefit to her child's health
that would result from being tested, there is no basis for a court to step in and
find her refusal unreasonable.
Assuming the testing hurdle can be overcome despite this analysis, the state
also may seek to compel treatment for a child after test results have indicated he
365is HIV-exposed. In this circumstance, a court may well find that preventive
treatment for an HIV-exposed child presents a life-or-death situation, and
accordingly order treatment over a parent's objection. Although it is still more
likely than not that the child will not receive any significant benefit from early
treatment and may even be harmed by unnecessary treatment, PCP prophylaxis
will prevent death for a significant minority of HIV-exposed infants.366
Furthermore, there is unanimous agreement in the medical community that PCP
prophylaxis is an appropriate and life-saving treatment for all HIV-exposed
children. 367 In light of these factors and judicial deference to the state in life-or-
death situations involving child health care, a court will almost certainly order
treatment to prevent PCp.
368
State efforts to compel combination therapy for an HIV-infected child would
present a more difficult issue. Combination therapy will not prevent an HIV-
related death, but may significantly prolong the life of an infected child. There is
little guidance on how the courts will approach parental medical decisions that
are life-preserving only in the short- or middle-term, and implicate intimate
family decisions regarding the quality of life of a terminally ill child. Treatment
issues in this area are further complicated by a lack of information or medical
consensus on the appropriate dosage and combination of antiretroviral
medications to prescribe for a terminally ill child. A court may be tempted to
fimd that if the child's quality of life can be preserved for a sufficiently long
period of time then it is appropriate to do so, especially when HIV medicine is
developing rapidly and a cure may be discovered while the child is still alive.
Although this is a superficially appealing position, it lacks precedential support
and conflicts with traditional constitutional concern for family privacy. When
decisions involving medical treatment of a child are medically controversial and
touch on the highly private issue of quality of life, they cannot be made in
reliance on legal or medical values alone, but rather involve calling on ethical
and other personal values that are at the core of constitutional protection of
365. This situation may arise when the parent consents to HIV testing but refuses to allow all or part of
the recommended treatment for pediatric HIV infection. It also may occur under an involuntary testing regime.
366. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
368. It should be noted that to ensure compliance with the PCP prophylaxis regimen, the state will need
to remove the child from the parent's care from age six weeks until either (1) the child is confirmed to be
uninfected with HIV at age six months, or (2) the child is over one year of age and no longer as susceptible to
PCP.
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family autonomy.369 In this situation, which arises with the decision whether to
put a child on combination therapy, the state should not intervene in family
decisionmaking and undermine parental autonomy.
3 70
c. Prenatal HIV testing and compelled medical treatment of pregnant women
The pregnant woman is in a unique position under the law protecting bodily
integrity, as she is a competent adult who generally may refuse unwanted
medical treatment, but she also is carrying a fetus in whose life the state has an
interest from the moment of conception. 371 It is unclear in the case law whether
the state should be as severely limited in its ability to compel medical treatment
over her objection as it is in the case of a non-pregnant competent adult, or
whether some modified form of the state's power to compel treatment to benefit
a minor child should apply.372 In practice, a number of courts have determined
that it does not unconstitutionally violate a pregnant woman's liberty to force her
to receive medical care for the benefit of her fetus, and so have ordered pregnant
women to submit to treatment over their objections. 373 These courts generally
have reached this result by balancing the mother's interest in refusing unwanted
medical care against the state's interest in preserving a threatened fetal life, and
finding that the state's interest outweighed the woman's interest to such an extent
that the intrusion into her body was constitutional.374
Other courts have refused to balance the state's interest in the fetus against
the woman's interest in bodily integrity, and have afforded pregnant women the
same right as competent adults to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 375 Under
this view, the state's interest in fetal life is insufficient to outweigh the pregnant
woman's right of privacy and bodily integrity. 376 Even if the child were alive and
an appropriate object of the state's full parens patriae powers, the state could not
force the child's mother to submit to medical treatment in order to save the
child's life. 377 The state's interest in the fetus cannot be greater than its interest in
369. See Goldstein, supra note 351, at 664 ("[T]he law must recognize that it cannot find in medicine or
for that matter in any science the ethical, political, or social values for evaluating health care choices.")
(internal parentheses omitted).
370. Some commentators assert that the state should never intervene to compel medical treatment of
child when the procedure at issue is medically or personally controversial. See Bennett, supra note 350, at 324.
371. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
372. See, e.g., Peta Lewis Hallisey, The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A Standard for Judicial
Intervention, 14 PAC. L.J. 1065, 1092 (1983) (proposing a rule where a state could intervene when the
recommended treatment would prevent serious irreversible harm to the fetus without posing a serious risk to
the mother's life).
373. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981); Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.YS.2d 898 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985).
374. E.g., Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
375. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (IIl. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C.
1990).
376. Nelson, supra note 107, at 757.
377. See A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44. Courts cannot compel one person to submit to a bodily intrusion for
the benefit of another person's health. Id.
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a born child.378 The abortion cases also make this point clear, by expressly
subordinating the state's interest in fetal life to the woman's health.379
The cases affording pregnant women the same right as non-pregnant adults
to refuse unwanted medical treatment clearly involve a more defensible
interpretation of the extent of the state's interest in the fetus under existing law.
However, even in jurisdictions where courts have aggressively intervened in
pregnant women's medical care, there remain arguments that mandatory HIV
testing and compelled treatment to reduce the risk of perinatal HIV transmission
unconstitutionally invade a pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity. First of
all, as in the case of newborn screening, prior to HIV testing the state has no
basis to assert that any particular woman is HIV-infected and poses a risk of
transmission to her fetus. Accordingly, there is no threat to a specific fetus's
health upon which the state could seek to justify testing its mother for HIV
against her will.
Furthermore, even if a court were to allow prenatal testing under the doctrine
of presumed consent,380 the case law compelling medical treatment of pregnant
women does not clearly justify ordering preventive treatment of an HIV-infected
pregnant woman. All of the compelled treatment cases involve fetuses who
would have died prior to or upon delivery if the mother did not undergo the
recommended treatment, and as a result the state's interest in fetal life was
clearly implicated in the mother's medical decision-making. No court has
ordered a pregnant woman to undergo medical treatment merely to improve the
health of a fetus whose live delivery was not threatened,38 1 and it is far from
clear that the state has any interest in fetal health per se. 3 82 Roe and Casey
recognize the state's interest in fetal life,383 but not in fetal health in any broader
sense. A pregnant woman's HIV-infection does not jeopardize the live birth of
her fetus,384 so it is unlikely that any state interest in the fetus is triggered.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the ultimate extent of the state's
interest in the fetus, any doubt over this issue should be resolved in favor of the
pregnant woman, given her established liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
378. Id. at 1244.
379. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
381. Even the lower courts that have compelled treatment of pregnant women have done so in reliance
on the state's interest in fetal life, not in any purported state interest in fetal health when the fetus's survival was
not at stake. See supra notes 373-374 and accompanying text.
382. Tort cases allowing children to collect damages for prenatal injuries also fail to recognize a state
interest in fetal health, and instead are founded on the born child's personal interest in being made whole for
prenatal damage to his health. See generally Johnson, supra note 110.
383. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (noting a state's interest
in the life of the unborn throughout pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (holding that a state
has an interest in potentiality of life).
384. In fact, there is a greater than seventy percent chance that the child will not suffer from any HIV-
related illness at all. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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medical treatment and the weak legal basis for asserting the full extent of the
state's parens patriae interest in this context.385
C. MANDATORY HIV TESTING AS A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH
Prenatal and newborn H1V-testing programs also raise Fourth Amendment
concerns. The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... ,,386 Under Supreme Court precedent, drawing
blood and subsequently analyzing a blood sample to obtain physiological data
each constitutes a separate and distinct search under the Fourth Amendment.
387
A private actor, such as a health care provider, that draws and tests blood in order
to comply with state regulations is subject to the Fourth Amendment's
restrictions on state action,38t as are all employees of public hospitals.389
Accordingly, the health care providers who implement any federal or state
mandatory prenatal or newborn HIV-screening program must do so, if at all, in a
manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment.39°
The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but
only those that are unreasonable.39 1 In the HIV context, reasonableness will be
judged by balancing the intrusion the HIV test imposes on an individual's Fourth
Amendment privacy against the test's promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.392 In criminal cases, a search generally is deemed unreasonable unless
it is accomplished pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause.393 Searches
385. As previously discussed, there is no basis for inferring any state interest in fetal health that is
broader than the state's interest in a born child's health (and, as the fetus is not a person, there is a strong
argument that any state interest in its health should in fact be narrower than the state's interest in a born child's
health). Supra note 378 and accompanying text. The state's interest in a born child's health does not justify
compelling either of the child's parents to undergo medical treatment on the child's behalf, even if the child's
life is at stake. See id. The state interest in the fetus's potentiality of life relied on by the Court to limit a
woman's right to seek abortion services from others, as in Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, should be read narrowly.
Any reading that embraces a broader view of the state's interest as one encompassing fetal health, and not
merely the fetus's life or death, is inconsistent with legal doctrine on the limit of the state's interest with respect
to born children. A broad reading also would go much farther than Casey itself by justifying active state
invasion of the woman's body for medical treatment purposes, and not merely passive restraint that forecloses
otherwise available medical options.
386. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
387. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
388. Id. at 614.
389. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1287 (2001).
390. Consensual searches generally do not violate the Fourth Amendment if consent is given voluntarily
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). "[Ihe question of whether a consent to a search was in
fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 227. "Routine with notification" HIV testing will not
implicate the Fourth Amendment if it is administered in such as way that consent is voluntarily given. If
"routine with notification" HIV testing were to become coercive in practice, however, it would be subject to the
same Fourth Amendment restrictions as mandatory HIV testing, and the analysis at infra notes 396-414 and
accompanying text would apply.
391. Sinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
392. See id.
393. Id. Under certain circumstances not relevant here, law enforcement officers may effect a reasonable
warrantless search when they have probable cause or a reasonable basis for suspecting criminal activity. See,
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of a primarily civil nature or purpose rarely are subject to the warrant
requirement, however, and have been found constitutional when they reasonably
serve "special needs" that make the warrant and probable cause requirements
impracticable.394 Current proposals for prenatal and newborn screening
programs are best characterized as civil searches, 395 and therefore the state is
likely to attempt to justify these HIV tests as special needs searches.
1. Mandatory prenatal HlVscreening
The first factor to be considered in a special needs reasonableness analysis of
mandatory prenatal HIV screening is the nature of the privacy interest upon
396
which the search intrudes. This factor focuses on the extent to which the
searched individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable.397 Pregnant women
clearly have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the health care setting. They
have a right to consent to or refuse unwanted medical treatment at their
discretion, 398 and a reasonable expectation that their confidential medical
information will not be disclosed to third parties. 399 Although they are subject to
a certain amount of regulation as a consequence of the state's interest in the life
of their fetus, that regulation is limited in its scope400 and always subordinate to
the life and health of the mother.401 Pregnant women continue to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to those issues beyond the scope
of the state's interest, such as the general health of their fetuses (as opposed to
the fetuses' life or death).40 2
Furthermore, pregnant women's legitimate expectation of privacy in their
own and their fetus's health is not limited in any of the specific ways that the
e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (upholding the reasonableness of warrantless alcohol
blood tests when delay would have risked the destruction of evidence).
394. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, at 619; Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
395. Current proposals for prenatal and newborn HIV testing rely on civil personnel and emphasize civil
goals such as preventing HIV infection and protecting the health of HIV-exposed children. See supra note 161
and accompanying text. However, given the existence of criminal HIV transmission statutes and proposals to
prosecute perinatal transmission under traditional criminal law doctrines, see Panossian, supra note 106, at 255,
prenatal HIV-screening programs could foreseeably trigger criminal sanctions. If some future prenatal HIV-
screening program heavily involved law enforcement and criminal prosecution in its public health efforts, the
special needs doctrine would no longer apply and the state would have to justify the intrusion under the
warrant/probable cause analysis employed in criminal cases. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct.
1281, 1290 (2001). However, it is unclear what level of law enforcement involvement would need to be shown
before a court would find the special needs doctrine inapplicable. See id. at 1290-1292 (noting excessive level
of police involvement on the facts of the case and not addressing whether some lesser level of involvement
would avoid constitutional violation).
396. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,654 (1995).
397. Id.
398. See supra notes 337-346, 369-383 and accompanying text.
399. See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1289.
400. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (holding
that the state cannot constitutionally enact regulation that places undue burden on woman's pre-viability
abortion decision).
401. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 379-383 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has relied upon to justify special needs searches in the past. The
Court has upheld special needs searches both in heavily regulated industries °3
and when submission to the search has been established as a condition for
eligibility for a particular benefit.4°4 In those cases, the searched individuals were
deemed to have a lesser expectation of privacy because they chose to work in the
regulated industry or affirmatively sought the conditional benefit. Pregnancy, on
the other hand, is not a heavily regulated industry, but instead falls squarely
within the ambit of reproductive and childbearing decisions afforded particular
privacy under the Constitution.4 °5 Furthermore, reproduction is a right, and not a
conditional benefit afforded by the state.406 Although it is possible to make the
argument that the state is conditioning not pregnancy but prenatal care on
submission to HIV testing, that construction does not justify inferring a lesser
expectation of privacy in light of the pregnant woman's expectation of privacy in
the doctor-patient relationship itself. Also, a pregnant woman may plausibly
assert that the right to reproduce includes the right to a pregnancy free of state
interference with her access to health care.407
The second factor to be considered in the Fourth Amendment analysis is the
character of the state intrusion.4 08 The Court has determined that drawing blood
itself imposes a minimal intrusion on the individual.40 9 Much more intrusive,
however, is the nature of the physiological information obtained when the blood
sample is chemically analyzed for HLV infection. The Court's special needs
cases all have involved screening blood and urine samples for illegal drugs, and
the Court has not recognized any troubling level of intrusiveness in obtaining
403. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (approving drug testing for
railroad workers involved in major rail accidents); cf. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(upholding random drug testing of student athletes).
404. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. 646 (upholding drug testing as condition for participation in school
athletics); National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding drug test as
condition for promotion to Customs post entailing direct drug interdiction or use of a firearm); see also Local
1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F.Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987) (approving
mandatory HIV testing of foreign service officers due to hazards of foreign postings); Anonymous Fireman v.
City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (approving mandatory HIV testing for firefighters due
to hazards of job). But see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (holding state could not require candidates
for public office to submit to drug testing).
405. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). To
the extent that intervention in the pregnant woman's health is justified by characterizing the fetus as a
prospective child with conditional rights, it should be noted that the woman also has a liberty interest in family
privacy and autonomy that affords her childrearing decisions constitutional protection. See supra notes 349-
353 and accompanying text.
406. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Eisenstat v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-455 (1972); Roe, 410 U.S. at
152.
407. A pregnant woman is a competent adult who has a recognized interest in making her own medical
decisions. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text. The right to refuse treatment is in this sense simply a
correlate of the right to exercise informed consent when medical decisions are at stake. State interference with a
pregnant woman's access to health care actively prevents her from making individual decisions regarding
health care, and is not permissible unless a recognized state interest justifies such a burden on individual
liberties. See supra notes 341-345 and accompanying text. The state cannot justify this burden in the HIV-
screening context. See Part V.B.2.C.
408. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
409. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
[Vol. 13: 195
Testing Pregnant Women and Newborns for HJV
that particular information. Notably, these decisions have repeatedly
emphasized that no personal health information was obtained from the relevant
samples,411 and imply that the Court would recognize the increased intrusiveness
of a screen for medical information that was not drug-related. Furthermore, the
intrusiveness of obtaining medical information itself would be greater than
average for HIV information, which is particularly sensitive given the social
stigma and discrimination that often accompany an HIV diagnosis.
The final factor to be considered in the special needs balancing test is the
nature and immediacy of the governmental concern prompting the intrusion.
412
Under its police powers, the state clearly has an interest in preventing perinatal
transmission of HIV.413 That interest is immediate when a woman who may be
infected with HIV becomes pregnant, as the risk of transmission can only be
reduced by discovering the woman's HIV status prior to delivery. However,
since the state cannot compel the woman to submit to preventive treatment,
4 14
the state's interest is not well-served by mandatory testing and cannot be justified
on public health grounds.415 The state also has a limited parens patriae interest
in the life of the woman's fetus. Nevertheless, as live delivery of the fetus is not
jeopardized by untreated HIV infection, the state cannot justify the search on this
basis, either. The state has no special need that is actually served by discovering
the HIV status of pregnant women. Mandatory prenatal HIV screening,
therefore, should be found unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Mandatory newborn HIV screening
Mandatory newborn HIV screening involves both different expectations of
privacy and enhanced state interests for Fourth Amendment purposes. Although
a parent has a constitutionally protected interest in family autonomy, her interest
in the care, custody and management of her child is always limited by the state's
parens patriae interest in the child. The limited nature of parental authority is
particularly clear in the medical context, where health care providers have a legal
duty in most states to report suspected child abuse to state authori4ies416 and
410 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 659; Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 646; Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 305 (1997).
411. See. e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 658 ("[I]t is significant that the tests at issue here look
only for drugs, and not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic").
412. Id. at 660.
413. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 378-383 and accompanying text.
415. But see id. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1295 (2001) (Kennedy, J. concurring)
("There can be no doubt that a mother's ingesting [cocaine] can cause tragic injury to a fetus and a child. There
should be no doubt that South Carolina can impose punishment on an expectant mother who has so little regard
for her own unborn that she risks causing him or her lifelong damage and suffering. The State, by taking special
measures to give rehabilitation and training to expectant mothers with this tragic addiction or weakness, acts
well within its powers and its civic obligations.").
416. See, e.g., id., at 1290 (noting health care providers' obligation under state law to report suspected
child abuse and neglect).
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where compelled treatment of children over parent's objection is not
417
uncommon.
At the same time, the state's parens patriae interest is fully implicated under
newborn testing programs, as it is not in the prenatal context where testing
occurs prior to the live birth of a child. In light of medical practice guidelines
calling for very early treatment of HIV-exposed newborns in order to prevent the
risk of serious illness, the state's interest also is immediate. Furthermore, given
the strong possibility that the state will succeed in compelling at least PCP
prophylaxis over any objection by the parent,418 the state's interest can be
achieved as a result of the search. Accordingly, even though newborn HIV
screening is highly intrusive in terms of the sensitive medical information it
reveals, a court is likely to find that newborn testing constitutes a special needs
search justified by the state's traditional interest in the welfare of born children,
which has been afforded particular deference in the health care context.
419
VI. PUTTING THE FRAMEWORKS TOGETHER: A CRITIQUE OF
CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN
AND NEWBORNS
A. MANDATORYNEWBORNHIVSCREENING
Mandatory newborn HIV-screening programs, such as the one currently in
place in New York State, will almost certainly be found constitutional under
existing law. The fact that the state can compel treatment for an HIV-exposed
child420 will tip the constitutional balancing tests applied under the Due Process
Clause and the Fourth Amendment decisively in the state's favor.
421
Despite its constitutionality, mandatory newborn testing is not justifiable in
public health terms. Newborn testing will benefit only a negligible percentage of
all infants tested, while creating a situation in which a significant majority of the
417. See supra notes 356-359 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 363-365 and accompanying text.
419. See Renna, supra note 152, at 445-46. But see Post, supra note 152, at 212-13 (asserting newborn
testing not a constitutional special needs search because it violates the mother's right to privacy in her own HIV
status and applying strict scrutiny review).
420. See supra notes 363-366 and accompanying text.
421. Mandatory newborn HIV testing is a constitutional special needs search under the Fourth
Amendment, see supra notes 414-418 and accompanying text, and likely will be found to be a constitutional
infringement of the newborn's confidentiality interest when linked to compelled care, see supra note 332 and
accompanying text. Although it is less clear that newborn HIV testing, as opposed to treatment, constitutionally
burdens the child's right to bodily integrity and the parent's right to autonomy in the care of her child, see supra
notes 360-362 and accompanying text, this basis for challenge retains little vitality once the test has been
deemed a constitutional search where the state need no longer rely on consent.
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HIV-exposed infants identified through testing will be subject to unnecessary
and potentially toxic treatment. Mandatory testing also could generate distrust
among affected social groups whose cooperation is essential to reducing the
transmission of HIV, and create situations in which families would be forced by
the state to confront knowledge of their child's HIV status while not receiving
access to the medical treatments necessary to preserve and improve his health.
Mandatory newborn testing is questionable, as well, because it will divert
attention and resources away from prenatal programs that can prevent new cases
of pediatric HIV infection.
Mandatory newborn HIV testing, then, presents a striking disconnect
between public health science and public health law. This disconnect may in part
explain why politicians have focused on newborn testing as their preferred
strategy for combating pediatric AIDS, while most public health commentators
have rejected it in favor of prenatal interventions that can actually prevent
perinatal transmission. In general terms, a disconnect such as this probably only
is possible when children's health is at stake. The modem legal framework for
analyzing the constitutionality of public health programs is attractive precisely
because it precludes the state from placing restrictions on individual liberties in
the name of public health when public health science fails to justify the
restrictive policy. Furthermore, even under the traditional public health doctrine
with its deference to state public health policies, courts would be unlikely to
uphold mandatory newborn HIV testing as a constitutional exercise of the police
power, as it is not medically justifiable and will not withstand factual scrutiny by
the court. Accordingly, programs such as mandatory newborn testing that do not
meet public health criteria will only survive review when they are supported by
the state's parens patriae power, which is not subject to the "medical necessity"
constraints that limit the state's police power to enact public health programs
targeting adults.
B. MANDATORY PRENATAL HIV SCREENING
Mandatory prenatal testing presents almost the opposite analysis. Although
prenatal HIV testing may well be justified in public health terms if it were linked
to treatment,422 it clearly is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause423 and
424the Fourth Amendment. Mandatory prenatal testing also unethically sacrifices
422. See supra Parts IV.A.3-1V.A.4. Of course, none of the current proposals for prenatal 111V testing
include any guarantee of access to treatment. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 187, at 798 (noting that IOM's
"routine with notification" proposal does not emphasize improving access to care). The federal government
does require state Medicaid programs to fund antiretroviral treatment to reduce the risk of perinatal
transmission, see supra note 163, but not all women have access to Medicaid. Even those women on Medicaid
are not guaranteed antiretroviral treatment postpartum, and may have legitimate concerns about developing a
virus-resistant strain of HIV if they take the government up on its limited offer to provide them with medical
care only during pregnancy See supra note 226. Current prenatal screening programs are ominously silent on
the issue of compelled treatment, as well.
423. See supra notes 310-317, 326-332, 369-370 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 396-415 and accompanying text.
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pregnant women's autonomy to a specific vision of fetal rights, assuming both
that women are in a confrontational relationship with their fetuses,425 and that
they have a duty to undergo treatment for their fetuses irrespective of consent or
any harm such treatment may pose to the women's own health.426
Mandatory prenatal H1V-testing proposals provide a stark example of the
policies that can emerge when distrust of the reproductive decisions of poor
women of color converges with fetal rights rhetoric. Proponents of mandatory
prenatal testing often present the issue as one involving a conflict between the
427mother's civil liberties and public health. They assume, contrary to reason,
that the mother's interests and the fetus's interests conflict4 28 and that the fetus,
backed by the force of the state, has some right to have his interests prevail.429
This idea that a pregnant woman is subordinate to her fetus is not unique to the
HIV context,430 but gathers disproportionate strength when the pregnant women
affected are poor women of color.
4 3 1
Under mandatory prenatal H1V-testing policies, HIV-infected women are
432treated more like pregnant drug users than like potential carriers of other
hereditary physical conditions, who generally are allowed to make their own
decisions about whether to be tested for heritable conditions and how to respond
to the results. 433 Although purportedly motivated by concern for fetal health,
434
mandatory HIV-testing policies in fact undermine fetal health care by
425. Cf Post, supra note 152, at 195 (asserting that mandatory newborn policies assume that coercion is
the only way to get HIV-infected mothers to do what is in the best interests of their children).
426. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
427. See Field, supra note 147, at 422-23.
428. It is much more plausible that the mother's and fetus's interests are particularly likely to converge in
the HIV context. A fetus is only at risk for HIV infection if its mother is already HIV-infected. The pregnant
woman is facing HIV disease and making treatment decisions on her own behalf, and she and her fetus face
similar treatment options. See supra notes 45-47, 79 and accompanying text. If the mother, facing similar and
arguably even more compelling decision factors as the fetus, decides that treatment is not in her own best
interest, it is unclear what basis the state, which is much less familiar with the context of a specific treatment
decision, has for asserting that it is in the child's best interest. See Stemlight, supra note 152, at 388.
429. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
430. See generally supra Part lI.B.
431. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
432. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1286
(2001) (describing hospital policy of conducting unconsented drug screens of pregnant women and efforts to
coerce drug treatment with criminal charges).
433. For example, genetic counseling is based on the concept of nondirective counseling. Nondirective
counseling involves advising couples who seek genetic counseling of their reproductive risks and their options
for dealing with those risks, and helping each couple choose the course of action most appropriate to them in
terms of their own values. See Kass, supra note 148, at 312.
434. Of course, these "[p]rofessions of concern for the offspring of HIV-infected women would ring
truer if those advocating more reproductive responsibility also called for some long overdue social
responsibility towards the needs of poor women of color." See Arras, supra note 243, at 358 (emphasis in
original).
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constructing an adversarial relationship between the fetus's primary caregiver435
and the health care system.
436
C. UNIVERSAL "ROUTINE WITH NOTIFICATION" PRENATAL HIV
SCREENING
The implementation of the IOM's "routine with notification" prenatal testing
problem will encounter few legal obstacles. To the extent that health care
providers actually seek, and pregnant women voluntarily give, consent to testing,
there is no basis upon which to assert that the state is forcing pregnant women to
do anything they have a right not to do or not to allow under the Constitution.4
Prenatal testing arguably also can be justified on public health grounds,438
making the IOM's proposal appear to be an attractive formula for identifying a
greater number of HIV-infected pregnant women for preventive treatment while
at the same time preserving the women's autonomy.
The most compelling objections to the IOM's proposal rest on ethical
grounds. The IOM's proposal undermines women's autonomy in two significant
ways. First, although consent is formally retained under a "routine with
notification" scheme, the deemphasis on counseling and informed consent
unquestionably opens the door to a defacto mandatory testing regime in which
health care providers quietly slip an HIV test into the standard prenatal panel.439
Given the lack of any evidence that pregnant women are likely to refuse testing
when they receive counseling and have an opportunity for fully informed
consent, it seems unjust to place the risk of involuntary testing on pregnant
women in this manner. Furthermore, even if the IOM's guidelines for eliciting
consent are followed in their entirety, pregnant women will not receive all of the
information required for them to give informed consent to HIV testing, or make
a truly autonomous decision in this regard. Imposing this burden on pregnant
women is entirely unacceptable from a justice standpoint, as women's health
arguably has already suffered due to the health care system's failure to address
their HIV-related risks and health care needs, and most of the purported
"failures" of current voluntary testing policies result from health care providers'
435. It is undisputed that the mother plays an essential role in facilitating her child's medical care, both
before and after birth, and that her cooperation with health care providers results in better care for the child. See
Post, supra note 152, at 181; Dumois, supra note 151, at 155.
436. "HIV testing 'is likely to be most successful if it begins with an informed patient and a trusted
advisor. Voluntary testing accomplishes this; mandatory testing . . . may actually reduce the chance that a
woman and her baby will receive needed therapies if they are alienated from the health care system."' Nina
Loewenstein, Mandatory Screening of Newborns for HIV: An Idea Whose lime Has Not Yet Come, 3 CARDozo
WOMEN'S L.J. 43, 50 (1996) (quoting Dr. Helen Gayle of the CDC).
437. No state intrusion to informational privacy occurs when a woman consents to testing, see supra
note 310 and accompanying text, and consent to treatment facially negates a woman's claim that her right to
refuse treatment was violated. Consensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 390.
438. See supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
439. See McCormick et al., supra note 187, at 797-98 (acknowledging danger that providers will not
seek effective consent but suggesting a sufficient response is to rely on providers' responsibility to their
pregnant patients).
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failure to offer HIV testing and treatment to pregnant women, not women's
refusal to consent to testing. Finally, limiting the amount of HIV-related
information provided to pregnant women may in fact actually lead to worse
health outcomes for their children, as the primary reason patients in general
refuse recommended treatment is poor communication with health care
providers who do not adequately explain the need for treatment.
440
Pediatric AIDS, and HIV infection in women, are highly concentrated in
minority communities and correlate with social problems of poverty and drug
use.441 It is easy to blame HIV-infected pregnant women and new mothers for
perinatal HJV infection,442 and mandatory prenatal and newborn HIV-testing
policies clearly do so, assuming that the these pregnant women and mothers will
not do what is "right" for their fetuses and children. Shortly after the
announcement of the ACTG 076 results, James W. Curran, then associate
director for HIV/AIDS at the CDC, stated:
How successful we are in implementing this prevention breakthrough
will be a test for all of us-in particular, a test of the community affected
by HIV in accepting the science and weighing the risks and benefits, a
test of the public health community in building trust and developing
consensus, and a test of society and the health care system in providing
the resources needed to implement it.
443
Seven years later, the public health community, the health care system and
society are failing that test, and seem intent on shifting the blame to HIV-
infected women. The move away from universal counseling of pregnant women,
and HIV testing only upon informed consent, may appear to be reasonable on
many levels, but its proponents seem to ignore the social context of ILV
infection in women, as well as the primary role the medical profession has
played in undermining the effectiveness of current voluntary screening
programs. Although the IOM's proposal for routine with notification prenatal
testing seems to afford a certain amount of respect to these women by allowing
them a limited form of consent, this proposal, no less than mandatory testing
schemes, places almost the entire burden of preventing pediatric HIV infection
on HIV-infected women. This narrow vision of consent may satisfy legal
objections, but it should not be allowed to hide the fact that routine with
notification prenatal HIV testing, and the burdens on HIV-infected women
associated therewith, are neither ethically justifiable nor necessary from a public
health standpoint 4" to efforts aimed at preventing perinatal HIV infection. The
440. A study of hospital patients showed that the primary reason patients refused treatment was the
perceived failure of doctors to inform them of the fact and purpose of ordered treatments or procedures. Paul S.
Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Patients Who Refuse Treatment in Medical Hospitals, 250 JAMA 1296, 1299
(1983). "Clearly, some patients desire to know more than they are ordinarily told about the purposes and risks
of treatment and diagnostic procedures, even when the physician considers them 'routine."' Id. at 1301.
441. See Sinton, supra note 101, at 231-232.
442. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
443. Simonds & Rogers, supra note 163, at 1515.
444. Although routine with notification testing can be justified on public health grounds, the public
health model does not prefer a truncated consent screening program to a fully voluntary screening program.
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IOM's proposal is flawed because it unjustly places doctors' convenience ahead
of poor women of color, and their access to information regarding one of the
most significant health problems facing themselves and their children.
Rather, the public health model simply does not directly address whether state coercion is justifiable as a
component of a screening program and, specifically in the context of prenatal HIV screening, is indeterminate
on the issue of consent. See Part IV.A.4 supra. Truncated consent therefore is not necessary, in public health
terms, to a prenatal screening program.
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